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Abstract
We examine state income and reputation incentives to account for the high dividends
of privatized firms. Consistent with these agency-cost based incentives, we show that
the extent of state ownership positively impacts corporate dividends. We distinguish
between the empirical importance of these incentives using variation in the rule of law to
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1. Introduction
We investigate the dividend premium of privatized firms.1 In the privatization liter-
ature, dividends have been shown to increase at privatization (Megginson and Netter,
2001) and remain high thereafter (Gugler, 2003; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008), but
there is no explanation provided as to why this is so. On the other hand, despite a
body of research which shows that corporate insiders (La Porta et al., 2000; Chay and
Suh, 2009), and, in particular, controlling and influential shareholders (Faccio et al.,
2001; DeAngelo et al., 2009; Isakov and Weisskopf, 2015; Attig et al., 2016), can have an
important impact on the formulation of dividend policy, there is scant evidence about
the influence of state ownership on corporate cash dividends. The task to identify and
test a link between the extent of state ownership in a firm and its dividends is, hence,
not only a significant open question for privatization scholars but also in respect to
scholarship on the impact of blockholders on dividends. Our study materially extends
these literatures, as we are the first to identify and test ownership related explanations
to account for the high dividends of privatized firms.
Accounting for the distinct incentives of the state, as a large shareholder in a priva-
tized firm, can help us better understand the patterns in payout policies of these firms.2
Pronounced agency problems can be introduced in the privatization process due to the
conflicting objectives of the state, with non-commercial and political concerns, and mi-
nority shareholders who, presumably, wish to maximize firm market value (Eckel and
Vermaelen, 1986; Perotti, 1995; Borisova et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2018). The expropri-
ation of minority shareholders by the state could, in principle, divert free cash flows,
i.e. via ‘tunnelling’, and, ultimately, reduce cash dividends.3 On the other hand, in
practice, where high dividends are the norm in privatized firms, the state may seek to
Finance and Banking Symposium, (Singapore, 2014), the FMA Europe conference (Venice, 2015) and
seminar participants at University College Dublin, the University of Liverpool, the University of Ok-
lahoma, the University of Iowa, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, Herriot-Watt University and
Université Paris Dauphine. This manuscript was advanced while Cal Muckley was a CRH Fulbright
scholar at Yale University. Cal Muckley would like to acknowledge the financial support of Science
Foundation Ireland under Grant Number 16/SPP/3347 and 17/SP/5447. The usual disclaimer applies.
1Privatization is the process of government divestiture of state-owned enterprises. Privatized firms
were once held exclusively by the state but have since been listed and are at least partially in public
hands. Non-privatized firms are publicly listed companies that have never been controlled by the
government.
2In a recent survey, DeAngelo et al. (2009) highlight that the preferences of a controlling shareholder
can have a first-order impact on payout policy.
3See Faccio et al. (2001); Johnson et al. (2000a,b); Claessens et al. (2000) for related evidence in
regard to non-privatized firms.
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allay the minority shareholders’ expropriation concerns by distributing the cash flows
in the form of dividends.4 As Perotti (1995) indicates the state may want to establish a
reputation for fair treatment of minority shareholders, with a view to raising capital in
the future. Indeed, unlike the stability over time of family ownership in family founded
firms (Isakov and Weisskopf, 2015), the extent of state ownership in privatized firms
typically decreases with the length of time since privatization.5 Alternatively, paying
high dividends may provide the state with an attractive source of fiscal income without
compromising its stake in the firm. Both the reputation and income explanations pre-
dict a positive relation between the extent of state ownership in a privatized firm and
the amount of dividends it distributes.
Our study is important not solely due to the capacity of state preferences to account
for the high dividend of privatized firms, but also due to the sheer extent of govern-
ment holdings of corporate capital globally. Megginson (2010) shows, for instance, that
privatized firms are among the largest four firms in terms of market capitalization in
every large country except the United States and Canada. Indeed, there is an extensive
holding of sovereigns in global equity markets, which has primarily resulted from rescue
efforts due to the financial crisis (Borisova et al., 2015; Megginson, 2017).6 There is,
moreover, a widespread prevalence of state ownership of corporations globally (Meg-
ginson, 2010; Borisova et al., 2012; OECD, 2018), which shows the potential for far
reaching and economically important implications of state ownership. The presence
of state-owned firms in the global economy has, in addition, grown strongly in recent
years. Today they account for over a fifth of the world’s largest enterprises (OECD,
2018), which, heightens the inherent possibility of privatizations in the future. Indeed,
that OECD (2018) report indicates that global privatization trends are on the rise in
recent years.7
To provide insight on the potential relation between the extent of state ownership
4Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) propose paying dividends to mitigate the agency problems
between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. The underlying idea, in that work, is that if
profits are retained in the firm, they may be diverted for perquisite consumption, empire building and
other value destroying activities and therefore outside shareholders would prefer dividends.
5In our data set, the state holds a majority stake in newly privatized firms in 61% of instances.
Four years after privatization this rate falls to 45% of instances, with the proportion of state majority
stakeholders in privatized firms declining thereafter.
6Borisova et al. (2015) reports that nearly 20 % of global stock market capitalization, in 2011, was
held by sovereign states.
7The annual dollar value of privatizations has risen from around 110 billion US$ in 2008 to 266
billion US$ in 2016.
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and corporate cash dividends, we compile a unique sample of 191 privatized firms, over
2,119 firm years, from 26 countries. Unlike prior work which examines post-privatization
firms’ dividends (Gugler, 2003; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008), for our sample of firms,
we identify, each year, the extent of state ownership (i.e. majority/ minority/ zero
holdings). Our hand-collected sample enables inference on the relation between the
extent of state ownership and privatized firms’ dividends, while accounting for a wide
set of variables that are well-known to pertain to dividends.
We provide a brief outline of our findings. Consistent with the view that state-owned
firms either initiate dividends or significantly increase their dividend payouts after list-
ing (Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999),
we show marked increases in dividends at privatization. We also show, in line with Gu-
gler (2003) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008), that privatized firms continue to pay
higher dividends than public firms during post-privatization years. We then turn to
explain this post-privatization dividend premium. A revenue type privatization (i.e.
where state retains more than 50% of the ownership) is shown to be associated with a
14.5 percentage point dividend-to-sales premium over that in a control type privatiza-
tion (i.e. where the state retains less than 50% of the ownership). This finding, in the
cross-section of privatized firms’ dividends, lends support to both our reputation and
income explanations.
We then discern between the empirical importance of the income and reputation
explanations. First, we look at the variation of minority shareholder protection inter-
nationally (La Porta et al., 2000, 1998; Djankov et al., 2008; Kaufmann et al., 2016). To
the extent that the reputation hypothesis is important, the dividends of revenue type
privatizations should be more negatively associated with minority shareholder protec-
tion than other privatized firms’ dividends. This follows as higher potential agency costs
can be associated with revenue type privatizations. Second, the political ideology of the
state is examined (Biais and Perotti, 2002; Ben-Nasr et al., 2012). A left-wing political
orientation of the state can imply an aversion towards the concession of control of a
privatized firm to the market. This, in turn, impedes the state from generating income
by stock concession transactions in the capital market. We, thirdly, look at the extent
to which the state’s income stream is likely to be inadequate. To the extent that the
income hypothesis is insightful, the more left-wing oriented the state and the more its
income stream is inadequate, the greater the extent of the revenue type privatized firm
dividends compared to other privatized firms’ dividends. Our findings, hence, suggest
the relative importance of the state’s reputation with minority shareholders to account
4
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for the high dividends of privatized firms.
One may be concerned about the endogeneity of the extent of state ownership in
a privatized firm. The state’s decision to privatize a firm in the first instance, or an
additional fraction of a firm subsequently, is not made at random. In a survey paper,
Megginson and Netter (2001) suggest that the state may prefer to ‘make privatiza-
tion look good by privatizing the healthiest firms first’. In line with this endogeneity
concern, full privatizations tend to outperform partial privatizations (Boardman and
Vining, 1989), control type privatizations tend to outperform revenue type privatiza-
tions (Boubakri et al., 2005) and partial privatization tends to outperform state-owned
enterprises (Gupta, 2005). Improvements in company performance might, ultimately,
account for the reported high dividends at privatization, potentially making the high
dividend independent of the privatization event. In this vein, our finding of high divi-
dends of revenue type privatizations are despite and cannot be due to the selection bias
of states to further privatize firms with better prospects. However, in line with Borisova
and Megginson (2011), we conduct instrumental variable two stage least squares re-
gressions, using the fiscal deficit (i.e. government debt as a percentage of GDP) as an
instrument for the extent of state ownership. In addition, we follow Chen et al. (2018)
and conduct a Heckman two-stage analysis to account for sample selection concerns.
Our main result, in regard to the influence of the extent of state ownership on dividends,
becomes even stronger once we mitigate for the potential endogeneity bias.
We implement a series of additional robustness tests and show that our main find-
ings remain qualitatively unchanged. Our robustness checks are based on a variety of
dimensions: (i) we use an array of payout measures (dividend-to-sales ratio, the natural
logarithm of dividends, dividend-to-earnings ratio, and dividends-to-total assets ratio)
to proxy for dividends paid by the sample companies; (ii) we test if the results can
be accounted for by the phase of the financial life-cycle of the privatized firm (Grullon
et al., 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006) and (iii) we test if the results are robust to the
cross-country and temporal variation in the dividend tax penalty (Poterba and Sum-
mers, 1984; Jacob and Jacob, 2013). Our main findings are substantively unchanged
across all these tests.
Two closely related papers to our work are those of Michaely and Roberts (2012)
and Isakov and Weisskopf (2015) in regard to, respectively, the influence of private
and public ownership structures and family blockholders on dividends. Michaely and
Roberts (2012) show, inter alia, using UK based firms, that publicly listed firms pay
higher dividends than matched private firms. The findings are accounted for as due
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to variation in frictions, inter-shareholder agency conflict and information asymmetry,
across ownership structures: wholly owned firms, private dispersed firms and public
firms. Our contribution, in contrast, relates to an international data set of wholly
and partially (i.e. privatized) state-owned firms, and this type of firm is excluded
by Michaely and Roberts (2012). Our findings coincide with theirs in that we show
an increase of dividends post listing. We, in addition, show this dividend premium
is especially evident for revenue type privatizations. In the post-listing sample we
show that similar to family blockholder effects on dividends (Isakov and Weisskopf,
2015), revenue type privatizations cause high dividends. Unlike in Isakov and Weisskopf
(2015), however, a reputation as opposed to an income incentive is shown to explain
the high dividends of privatized firms. This is possibly due to the state’s objective to
concede ownership in privatized firms relative to a family founded firm’s preference to
retain ownership for future generations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a
discussion of the related literature and the development of our hypotheses tests. Section
3 presents our data sources and characterizes our sample. Section 4 presents our results.
Section 5 considers alternative explanations related to the financial life-cycle. Section
6 concludes.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
To account for the cash amounts distributed by firms to their shareholders most
studies, since the seminal dividend studies of Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani
(1961), have presumed a clear separation between management and a large number
of small shareholders. Absent influence on the board of directors or management,
such small shareholders cannot individually impact dividend decisions. More recent
literature, however, has shown that influential blockholders and controlling shareholders
(e.g. founding families and financial institutions) can have an important influence on
corporate dividends.
We turn to investigate the dividend premium of privatized firms. On the one hand,
the question of why privatized firms pay high dividends has gone unanswered. On
the other hand, the influence of state ownership on post privatization dividends has
received limited attention in scholarship. Extending prior work, in public firms, on
the implications for dividends of corporate insiders and, in particular, controlling and
influential shareholders, our study is the first to examine whether the extent of state
6
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ownership can explain the dividend premium paid by privatized firms. We propose
state reputation (i.e. allay expropriation concerns of minority shareholders) and state
income (i.e. extraction of cash to supplement state income) related explanations for
the high dividends of privatized firms, and we discern between the relative empirical
importance of these explanations.
2.1. The reputation and income hypotheses
We propose that privatized firms can pay high dividends with a view to building a
reputation for the state, especially when it is a controlling shareholder, in regard to its
protection of the interests of minority shareholders.8 The concern of minority share-
holders is that the state may have distinct, possibly politically motivated, preferences;
which do not align with firm value maximization (Eckel and Vermaelen, 1986; Perotti,
1995; Borisova et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2018). The state can, as per the ‘substitution
model’ of La Porta et al. (2000), wish to allay concerns of minority shareholder expro-
priation and, thus, minimize the cost of equity. This can facilitate the state if/when
it decides to further concede its ownership. Also, in line with the reputation building
argument made by Perotti (1995), we argue that by paying high dividends, the state
can reduce the uncertainty regarding its reallocation of firm value or possible misuse of
firm resources, and convey its commitment to its privatization policy.9 A sufficiency of
dividends can substitute for impaired governance mechanisms due to the presence of the
state in the ownership structure of the privatized firm. This can, in turn, re-assure the
minority shareholders that their interests are at least significantly protected, and reduce
their incentive to monitor privatized firm management10 and facilitate the issuance of
equity by the privatized firm in future. Higher ownership by the state suggests higher
8It is well known that a divergence of interests can prevail between controlling and minority share-
holders in public firms (Berle and Means, 1932; Fan and Wong, 2002). It has been shown that this can
ultimately lead to ‘tunnelling’ i.e. the expropriation of minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000a,b;
Faccio et al., 2001), and reduced firm value (Claessens et al., 2000).
9Perotti (1995) presents a theoretical model to explain why, despite improved redistribution and
incentives associated with private control, the transfer of ownership in privatizations is gradual rather
than rapid. Gradual concession of ownership and non-interference on part of state, imparts a reputation
related signal to investors, that the government is willing to bear the risk along with the investors.
The rationale is that, otherwise, investors would be concerned about expropriation by the government,
especially in a revenue type privatization. This reputation signal can align with the state’s ultimate
goal of selling the remaining shareholdings to the investors.
10High dividends can offset an incentive of minority shareholders to monitor management (e.g.
‘sleeping dogs’ approach to dividends in Warther (1993); Zwiebel (1996); Myers (2000); DeAngelo and
DeAngelo (2000)).
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influence on firm’s policies and, therefore, higher expropriation concerns by minority
shareholders. It also indicates that the state has a greater exposure to the firm in regard
to future privatization. As a result, the incentive for the state to build a reputation, in
this way, is greater the larger the shareholding of the state in the privatized firm.
We also propose that the state can seek to pay high dividends for reasons related to
its income. As with family owned firms, which can have intergenerational constraints on
the concession of ownership (DeAngelo et al., 2009; Isakov and Weisskopf, 2015; Attig
et al., 2016), the state can have a politically informed preference not to concede its
control (Biais and Perotti, 2002; Ben-Nasr et al., 2012). This governmental preference,
not to further concede ownership, can manifest into high dividends to facilitate income
for the state, while maintaining its influence on the privatized firm.11 The greater the
extent of state ownership, the greater the claim of the state on distributed dividends,
and the more attractive the dividend channel is to the state to raise income.
Taking the reputation and income hypotheses together, we hypothesize that the
higher the level of state ownership in privatized firms, the higher the dividends paid.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Privatized firms will pay higher dividends the greater the extent
of government ownership.
As both the reputation and income hypotheses predict high privatized firm divi-
dends, we conduct two additional sets of tests to discern between the relative impor-
tances of these hypotheses to explain the high dividends of privatized firms.
2.2. Discerning between the reputation and income hypotheses
Our first set of tests focuses on the reputation hypothesis. As indicated above, this
explanation can be motivated by the ‘substitution model’ of La Porta et al. (2000). That
model indicates that firm insiders, especially in weak minority shareholder protection
countries, can prefer to pay high dividends when they anticipate a future issuance of
equity. The state, we argue, especially when it holds a majority of the voting shares, may
therefore induce management to pay out sufficient dividends to build a reputation of fair
11In a setting of perfect capital markets, the Fisher separation theorem asserts that the primary
objective of a corporation will be the maximization of its present value, irrespective of the income
preferences of its shareholders. Small shareholders can conduct transactions in the capital market to
generate income. Large shareholders, e.g. the state or family founding firms, however, may have an
aversion to conceding control. Dividends, in this latter setting, may be used to extract income from
the firm independent of firm value maximization.
8
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251812 
treatment with its minority shareholders.12 To evaluate the reputation hypothesis, we,
hence, test if revenue type privatized firm dividends are more negatively associated with
the rule of law to protect minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; Djankov et al.,
2008; Kaufmann et al., 2016), than other privatized firm dividends. We hypothesize
and test whether dividends of revenue type privatizations are higher in countries with
low minority shareholder protection.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Revenue type privatized firms with low protection to minority
shareholders will pay higher dividends.
Our second set of tests focuses on the income hypothesis. To discern between the
importance of the reputation and income hypotheses, we account for the political ideo-
logical orientation of the state. Following Biais and Perotti (2002) and Ben-Nasr et al.
(2012), we distinguish between left-wing and right-wing governments. Left-wing gov-
ernments are both less likely to implement market-oriented policies (e.g. privatization)
and, should they do so, less committed to these policies. Accordingly, a preference
to retain control of a privatized firm is likely to be more pronounced in left-wing as
opposed to right-wing governments. In a left-wing oriented political regime, we, hence,
argue that, dividends, would be more likely to be high, to provide an additional income
to the state. This would be especially our expectation when the state has a majority
stake in the firm as in this instance the state, likely, has sufficient influence to induce
management to pay out dividends. Also, in this instance, the state will be the princi-
pal beneficiary of dividends disbursed. We, hence, hypothesize that, in a revenue type
privatization setting, the left-wing political orientation of the state is associated with
high dividends.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Revenue type privatized firms when the state has a left-wing po-
litical orientation will pay higher dividends.
As a related sub-hypothesis, we test if left-wing oriented governments which have
limited cash (i.e. a high fiscal deficit) pay even higher dividends. If so, this would also
lend important support to the state income hypothesis.
12An OECD (2018) report, on privatization and state ownership, suggests that in about half the
countries observed, dividends for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are explicitly, on an annual basis,
negotiated between SOE boards and the state shareholder.
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3. Data and Variable Description
We examine a sample of 191 privatized firms with up to 2,119 firm years.13 We have
over 4,000 non-privatized firms available for comparison.14 The privatized firms in our
sample are listed on exchanges (and headquartered) across 26 countries. The data are
primarily obtained from SDC Platinum and Worldscope, but also from Datastream and
the World Bank’s Privatization Transactions Database. In addition, we hand collected
state ownership data over the years following the privatization event. The process of
hand collection involved multiple rounds of searches on Lexis-Nexis to determine if and
when the state ownership changed for our sample firm after the privatization. We also
obtained the data on state ownership from the Privatization Barometer database, com-
pany annual reports, MarketScreener and company websites.15 Our sample commences
in 1990 and extends through 2013.16
For a comprehensive analysis, we examine multiple measures of dividends. DIV is
the total common cash dividend paid in a fiscal year. We follow Brockman and Unlu
(2009) and use the dividend-to-sales (DIV/SALES) ratio as our dependent variable of
primary interest. Earnings management varies internationally and the scope for such
manipulation is negatively correlated with the strength of investor rights (Leuz et al.,
2003). Investor rights are critical to several of our main hypotheses tests. Hence, to
maximize our sample size and to reduce measurement error, our primary focus is on the
dividend-to-sales (DIV/SALES) ratio. However, we also construct and present findings
for the natural log of dividend payments, dividend-to-earnings before interest and taxes
(DIV/EBIT) and dividends-to-total assets (DIV/TOTALASSETS) following (Von Eije
and Megginson, 2008), Chay and Suh (2009) and DeAngelo et al. (2006), respectively.17
We include several variables to account for the ownership structure of our sample
of firms. We follow D’Souza et al. (2005) to construct FOREIGN, a dummy variable
that indicates whether the primary investor in a new privatization is a foreign firm.
13We define privatization, consistent with Worldscope, as a government owned or government con-
trolled entity that sells shares or assets for the first time to a non-government entity.
14Consistent with recent literature on corporate payout determination (Von Eije and Megginson,
2008; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Chay and Suh, 2009; Brockman and Unlu, 2009), we exclude American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), and firms with negative dividends and sales.
15Key words used in the searches include: ownership, state, privatization, acquisition, shareholders,
history and golden share.
16We begin with 1990 because coverage of firm-specific data outside the United States prior to 1990
in Datastream and other international databases is limited (Denis and Osobov, 2008).
17Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definition of variables and Appendix B for a description of
our data set of privatizations across countries, legal systems, type of privatization and industry sectors.
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Similarly, INSTITUTIONAL is a dummy variable that indicates whether the primary
investor is an institutional investor (Gupta, 2005). Following Chay and Suh (2009), we
include the fraction of common stock owned by insiders (CLOSE) as a proxy variable
for agency conflict. TOTALGOVHOLDING is the proportion of a firm’s stock owned
by the state during the post privatization period.18 Megginson et al. (1994) formulated
a dummy variable, ‘revenue’, that indicates whether the state retains more than 50
percent of ownership at the time of privatization. Using the hand collected data on state
ownership, we create a new variable, REVENUE_NEW, which is a dummy variable
that is equal to one if the state, in any given year, owns more than 50 percent of the
shares. Note that while ‘revenue’ is based on the ownership at the time of privatization,
REVENUE_NEW is constructed by tracking the state ownership through the years.
As a result, while ‘revenue’ is a static variable, REVENUE_NEW is dynamic in nature.
To control for the income risk of the firm, we follow Von Eije and Megginson (2008)
and include the standard deviation of the previous three years’ net income scaled by
year-specific total assets (INCOMERISK). To proxy for growth opportunities, we con-
struct annualized real change in total assets (ASSETGROWTH) similar to Fama and
French (2001) and an annualized real change in sales (SALESGROWTH) following
Brockman and Unlu (2009) and Boubakri et al. (2005).
As in D’Souza and Megginson (1999) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008), we con-
trol for firm-level leverage (LEVERAGE), measured as debt to total assets, which can
ameliorate prospective agency costs of free cash flows due to associated monitoring by
creditors (Jensen, 1986). Following Megginson et al. (1994) and Boubakri and Cos-
set (1998), we incorporate sales to employees (SALES/EMPLOYEES) to reflect firm-
level efficiency. To account for investor rights, we follow La Porta et al. (1998) and
include a dummy variable (COMMONLAW) for common law countries in our sam-
ple. RULELAW reflects the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society (La Porta et al., 1998; Kaufmann et al., 2016). LEFTWING is
a country-specific annual dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s Cen-
tral Government is left-wing oriented (Ben-Nasr et al., 2012). We follow Poterba and
Summers (1984) to construct the TAXPENALTY variable. Heterogeneity in investors’
demand for dividends can also reflect individual behavioral biases. We account for
this clientele (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2008) by including a stock price based catering
18These data are sourced at the KPMG Privatization Barometer. They are available for European
privatizations only.
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(CATERING) measure of investor demand for dividends (Baker and Wurgler, 2004).
We also include a time trend variable (YEAR) to account for a deterministic time trend
in payout amounts (Von Eije and Megginson, 2008). GDPGROWTH (D’Souza et al.,
2005; Boubakri et al., 2005) is included to capture the annual per capita growth in a
country’s GDP. Finally, following Borisova and Megginson (2011), as an instrumental
variable we use the government debt as a percentage of GDP (NATIONALDEFICIT).
Country-specific consumer price indices are used to deflate the nominal firm-specific
accounting and financial data into real 1990 US$. Local currency values are converted
into US$ using the year-end exchange rate. To adjust for extreme outliers, we winsorize
the variables at the top and lower 1% of their respective distributions (Pinkowitz et al.,
2006; Harford et al., 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011).
4. Results
We present our findings in three parts. First, we confirm the existence of a dividend
premium for our sample firms immediately following the privatization. Using both a
univariate and multivariate analysis, we confirm that our sample exhibits an increase
in dividends for privatized firms. Second, using a post-privatization and cross-sectional
comparison of privatized firms, we present findings that provide evidence of a positive
impact of the extent of state ownership on dividends. This finding is consistent with
both the reputation and income hypotheses. In the last part, we empirically discern
between the relative importances of the reputation and income hypotheses.
4.1. Dividends by privatized firms around privatization
In Table 1, we report univariate findings for dividends. For a comprehensive analysis,
we use four different measures of dividends: unscaled total real (1990 prices) amount of
dividends (DIV), dividends-to-sales ratio (DIV/SALES), dividends-to-earnings before
interest and taxes ratio (DIV/EBIT), and dividends-to-total assets ratio (DIV/TOTALASSETS).19
In Panel A we focus on privatized firms and report the means and medians for
the measures of dividends during three years before and three years after privatiza-
tion.20 The data show that majority of firms either increase (or initiate) dividends
19The measures of dividends are derived from existing studies such as Von Eije and Megginson
(2008); Brockman and Unlu (2009); Chay and Suh (2009) and DeAngelo et al. (2006).
20We follow previous studies (Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Boubakri
et al., 2005; D’Souza et al., 2005) such that companies are required to have at least two years of
consecutive data during both pre- and post-privatization periods. This restriction reduces our sample
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after privatization. For instance, the comparison of DIV pre- and post-privatization
suggests that 79.2% of the firms exhibit an increase in dividends after privatization.
The numbers for the other measures of dividends are around 70%, with DIV/SALES
being minimum with 68.3%. While mean (median) dividends paid during the years
preceding the privatization event is $103.84 million ($17.79 million), it more than dou-
bles to $209.47 million ($37.27 million) during the three years immediately following
privatization. Consistent with previous studies (Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri and
Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999), we observe a similar increase in the three
scaled measures of dividends after initial privatization. The p-values indicate that all
the differences between pre- and post-privatization dividends are statistically significant
at 1% level, except the difference in the means for DIV/EBIT.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
In Panel B, we compare the dividends for privatized and non-privatized firms. The
mean and median for the unscaled dividend variable (DIV) show that the privatized
firms pay much larger dividends than the non-privatized firms. While the mean div-
idend payment by privatized companies in our sample is $306.83 million, the average
payment by non-privatized firms is only $40.57 million.21 Also, the median dividend
paid by privatized firms ($39.75 million) relative to non-privatized firms ($1.18 million)
highlights the fact that privatized firms pay much higher dividends. However, one can
argue that the difference between DIV can be explained by the differences in the size of
firms in these groups as privatized companies tend to be significantly larger. Therefore,
we also examine the scaled measures of dividends. The pattern is consistent across all
measures of dividends. Both the means and medians are higher for privatized firms
and the differences are statistically significant at 1% level. In short, Table 1 shows
that, consistent with previous studies, our sample of privatized firms exhibit a dividend
premium relative to non-privatized firms.
Next, to better test for an association between privatization and dividend policy
we examine the sample of privatized firms and a matching sample of non-privatized
size for this analysis.
21Von Eije and Megginson (2008) also compare unscaled dividends (page 357), where they examine
‘the impact of privatization on the payout policies of divested firms’, and show substantively similar
results for firms in the European Union. They suggest that something about the event of privatization
induces divested companies to increase not only the absolute level of dividend payments but also the
fraction of earnings paid out to shareholders.
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companies in a multivariate setting.22 We use a dummy variable (PVT) to identify the
privatized firms and a dummy variable (After) that is equal to one during post-listing
years. We recognize that as firms transition from being fully state-owned to being
privatized, other firm characteristics may change, some of which possibly related to
the firm’s dividend policy.23 Therefore, we implement fixed effects regression models
that include firm-level control variables.24 We estimate model specifications that are
variants of the following form:
DivPaidi,t = β1 + β2PV Ti,t + β3Afteri,t + β4PV T ∗ Afteri,t
+Firm Controls+ Fixed Effects+ εi,t
(1)
where DivPaid refers to different payout measurements, i refers to the ith individual
firm and t refers to the year. Firm controls refer to a set of firm-level control variables
with a one year lag. Furthermore, we include fixed effects: firm, industry, year and
country, as appropriate. In separate models, we use DIV/SALES, the natural log
of dividend payments (Von Eije and Megginson, 2008), DIV/TOTALASSETS, and
DIV/EBIT as the dependent variable. In Model 1, we report a test for the familiar
positive association between PVT and dividends. Our point of focus, in Models 2-6,
is the coefficient for the interaction term between PVT and After (β4) as it estimates
the increase in dividends of privatized companies once listed, relative to listed non-
privatized firms. We expect β4 > 0. Findings are reported in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
We begin our analysis by using DIV/SALES as a proxy for a firm’s dividend activity
and including only the privatization dummy (PVT) as an explanatory variable in Model
1. Consistent with the univariate findings reported in earlier tables, we find a significant
22For each privatized firm we use propensity score matching to find, in the same year, a non-privatized
matching firm based on country of origin, firm size, cash holdings, and growth in total assets. We
require that both privatized and non-privatized firms have at least two years of data before and after
the year of privatization. A covariate balancing test is performed which shows that the standardized
difference on each matching criterion, across privatized and non-privatized firms, is sufficiently small
(Smith and Todd, 2005). This covariate balancing test is available from the authors on request.
23Please refer to Appendix C for evidence of significant firm trait changes at privatization.
24This is similar to approach of Michaely and Roberts (2012) for non state-owned private firms which
transit to having a public firm status.
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positive relation between privatization and dividend payouts. The coefficient of 0.123
suggests that, compared to non-privatized companies, the DIV/SALES ratio for the
privatized firms is about twice that of non-privatized firms.25 However, Model 1 does
not address whether the difference between the two groups can be associated with the
event of privatization. Therefore, we create another dummy variable (After) that takes
a value of one for years after the privatization and zero otherwise. In Model 2, the high
statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term PV T ∗ After (1.189)
suggests that the dividend premium is strongly associated with the event of privatiza-
tion. In particular, this coefficient suggests that the difference in DIV/SALES, between
the two groups, increases markedly after privatization. Next, to test the robustness
of this finding, Model 3 includes proxy variables for different factors that have been
shown to be associated with a firm’s dividend policy. The coefficient on the PVT*After
interaction term remains significant and positive. We continue our analysis by using
alternate dependent variables to test the robustness of our findings. In Model 4, we
use natural log of dividends as the dependent variable and find almost identical results
to Model 3. Further, in Models 5 and 6, we use DIV/EBIT and DIV/TOTALASSETS
and find consistent results. Our main takeaway from this table remains unchanged.26
We next include all the non-privatized firms in our sample in the regression mod-
els to further check, in line with Gugler (2003) and Von Eije and Megginson (2008),
for an association between post-privatization dividends and the privatization dummy.27
Our findings are reported in Table 3. The coefficients for the constant term and PVT
in Model 1 are similar to those in Model 1 of Table 2, confirming the significance of
PVT. Findings for Model 2 provide evidence on the same association between PVT and
dividends, accounting for firm-level determinants of dividends. As expected, dividends
25The coefficient on the constant term in Model 1 of 0.103 is the DIV/SALES for non-privatized
firms. This estimate increases by 0.123 for privatized firms. Hence, the DIV/SALES ratio for the
privatized firms is about twice as high as for non-privatized firms [(0.103+0.123)/(0.103) = 2.19].
26In unreported results, we focus only on the privatized firms and replace the PVT dummy in
Equation (1) with the REVENUE_NEW dummy, which takes a value of one if the state retained more
than 50% ownership in the privatization. This enables us, in a constrained data set, to test for an
association between the type (revenue vs control) of privatization and dividends. We find a statistically
significant and positive coefficient for the REVENUE_NEW*After interaction in all models. These
findings suggest that the revenue type privatization firms pay significantly higher dividends relative to
the control type privatization firms in the three year window after privatization. We provide a more
formal test of changes in dividend policy, across these two privatization types in post-privatization
data, in the next section of the paper.
27Please refer to Appendix D for detail of tests of differences in firm characteristics of privatized and
non-privatized firms.
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are significantly negatively associated with CLOSE, LEVERAGE, SALESGROWTH,
and INCOMERISK and significantly positively associated with CASH, RETE, EARN-
INGS, ABNORMALEARNING, and Ln (TOTALASSETS). As before, we check the
robustness of the association, between PVT and dividends, by using different measures
of dividends as the dependent variable. Our main explanatory variable of interest is
PVT, which remains significantly and positively associated with dividends.28 Hence,
part one of our empirical work confirms that privatized firms pay higher dividends than
prior to privatization and relative to non-privatized listed firms. It also suggests that
revenue type privatizations pay higher dividends than control type privatizations.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
4.2. Dividends by privatized firms and the extent of state ownership
In this section, we show a strong link between majority state ownership and div-
idend policy of privatized firms. In the first instance, we use regression models that
account for industry, year, and country fixed-effects. The findings are reported in Ta-
ble 4. We focus on the REVENUE_NEW variable, which is created based on our
hand-collected data on state ownership over the years. It takes a value of one, each
year, if the state retains a majority holding in the privatized firm, and zero other-
wise. The positive and significant coefficient (0.146) on REVENUE_NEW in Model
1 shows a strong association between dividends (DIV/SALES) and whether the priva-
tized firms have majority shareholdings.29 In Model 2, we test whether the presence
of an institutional investor or a foreign investor alters the inferred association between
REVENUE_NEW and cash dividends. Our findings show a positive association be-
tween presence of a foreign investor and a privatized firm’s dividend payouts. Foreign
investors maintain oversight of managers’ actions (Dyck, 2001), and it is also previously
reported that institutional investors exert a high degree of monitoring of management
activities (Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). However, we
find a statistically insignificant relation between DIV/SALES and the presence of in-
28Please refer to Appendix E for a multivariate analysis with a propensity score matched sample,
which gives substantively the same finding.
29The coefficient on the constant term in Model 1 of 0.205 is the DIV/SALES for non-privatized
firms. This estimate increases by 0.146 for privatized firms. Hence, the DIV/SALES ratio for the
privatized firms is 70 % higher than that for non-privatized firms [(0.146+0.205)/(0.205) = 2.19]. This
corresponds to a 14.6 percentage point DIV/SALES premium for privatized firms.
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stitutional investors. Most importantly, addition of these variables hardly changes the
statistical significance or the magnitude of the coefficient for REVENUE_NEW, which
is the main variable of interest. In Model 3 we include our proxy for ownership concen-
tration (CLOSE) and find an insignificant relation between ownership concentration
and dividends paid by privatized companies.30 The point of focus is the coefficient
for REVENUE_NEW, which is practically unchanged. To further test the robust-
ness of REVENUE_NEW, we include other known determinants of dividend policy
in Model 4. As expected we find a positive relation between dividends and CASH,
RETE, EARNINGS, and SALES/EMPLOYEES and a negative relation between div-
idends and LEVERAGE, ASSETGROWTH, and SALESGROWTH. The association
between REVENUE_NEW and DIV/SALES is robust to the addition of these other
determinants of dividends. A revenue type privatization, as predicted in Hypothesis
1, is shown to be associated with a 14.5 percentage point dividend-to-sales premium
over that in a control type privatization. Next, we re-run Model 4 using the differ-
ent measure of dividends, natural log of dividends, the dividends-to-EBIT ratio, and
the dividends-to-total assets ratio as the dependent variable. The association between
REVENUE_NEW and dividends remain unchanged in Models 5, 6, and 7. Therefore,
the findings reported in Table 4 suggest that the privatized firms’ dividends are related
to the ownership structure, in particular, they are conditional on whether the state
owns a majority stake in the firm.31
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
The state’s decision to privatize a firm is not made at random but is rather a
deliberate decision to select a company, or a fraction of a company, for privatization,
that is likely to be viewed positively by investors. This, in turn, is constrained by the
set of firms within specific industries which are initially owned by the state. State-
owned companies with better market prospects, for instance in relation to sales growth,
are more likely to generate substantial cash flows for the state, if divested. The state
30This finding is in line with discussion in Chay and Suh (2009) P. 91. They suggest that if there
are agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, the ‘relationship between insider
ownership and dividends may become weak or even positive’.
31Please refer to Appendix F for tests, in a similar vein, between dividends for partially versus fully
privatized firms. These tests also show that less government ownership (i.e. fully privatized firms)
pay out fewer dividends. Finally, in Appendix G find Probit regressions which show the importance
of REVENUE_NEW in accounting for the likelihood of privatized firms paying dividends.
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may prefer to ‘make privatization look good by privatizing the healthiest firms first’
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). Such improvements in company performance might
account for the reported dividend increases after privatization, potentially making the
dividend increases independent of the privatization event or the residual extent of state
ownership. An empirical estimate consistent with a relation between privatization and
dividend increases might thus arise due to a self-selection bias. In light of this rationale,
our regressions of REVENUE_NEW on dividends act as a useful falsification test. In
this vein, we highlight that the high dividends of revenue type privatizations, which we
document, are despite and cannot be due to the self-selection bias of states to further
privatize firms with better prospects. If the outlined self-selection bias had a first order
impact on the inference, we would expect, to the contrary to our findings, control type
privatizations to pay higher dividends than revenue type privatizations. Indeed, we
expect, that the coefficient estimate on the extent of state ownership to be attenuated
due to this self-selection bias.
Having said that, this latter falsification test result does not rule out the possibility
of endogeneity compromising our inference in Table 4. Therefore, we use two-stage
least square regressions with instrumental variables (IV2SLS) and a Heckman two-stage
analysis (Heckman, 1979) in our attempt to mitigate the endogeneity concerns.
In line with Borisova and Megginson (2011), we conduct IV2SLS regressions, using
the national deficit.32 As argued by Borisova and Megginson (2011), if the national
deficit is large and needs trimming, the state might be inclined to sell a higher proportion
of its shares in the firm. We believe, in addition, that this instrument satisfies the
exclusivity ‘only through’ criterion. Except for our discussion in this paper of the role
the state’s national deficit may have on dividends through REVENUE_NEW (i.e. the
income hypothesis), there is no theory of dividend determination which specifies the
national deficit as an explanatory variable for dividends.33
The findings for the IV2SLS regressions are reported in Model 1 of Table 5. In Stage
1 of the model, we regress REVENUE_NEW on the instrument together with the full
set of control variables and industry and year fixed effects. We find a significant relation
32National deficit is defined as the ratio of a nation’s outstanding debt to its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). This data is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook
database.
33See also our Table 7 Panel B which indicates an absence of support for the inclusion of national
deficit in the DIV/SALES regression of privatized firms.
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between REVENUE_NEW and the instrument.34 The findings for Stage 2 show that
the estimated exogeneous component of REVENUE_NEW significantly impacts divi-
dends. Its coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant. Indeed, as per our
expectation, our main finding, in regard to the influence of the extent of government
ownership on dividends, has become even stronger once we mitigated for endogeneity
bias.
We also conduct, in line with Chen et al. (2018), a Heckman two-stage analysis
(Heckman, 1979) to address sample selection concerns. The findings are reported in
Model 2 of Table 5. In the first Stage, we use a Probit model to predict whether gov-
ernments retain control over privatized firms (REVENUE_NEW). In particular, for
Stage 1, we regress REVENUE_NEW on total government holdings, TOTALGOV-
HOLDING (which we have for 101 European privatized firms, from KPMG Advisory’s
Privatization Barometer), National Deficit and the full set of control variables, and
industry and year fixed effects, as in Model 4 of Table 4. In the reported second Stage
regression, our dependent variable is DIV/SALES and we include the bias correction
term, Lambda (inverse Mills ratio), in the model. As per our findings concerning the
influence of state control in privatized firms (REVENUE_NEW) on their dividends, a
positive relation is inferred between DIV/SALES and total government holdings (TO-
TALGOVHOLDING). Further, Lambda loads positively and is statistically significant
at the 1% level.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Overall, our conclusions for Table 5 are similar to those for Table 4. The results dis-
cussed so far are, however, consistent with both the reputation and income hypotheses.
In the next section, we implement empirical tests that allow us to distinguish between
the two hypotheses.
4.3. Discerning empirically between the reputation and income hypotheses
The results discussed up to this point suggest a positive impact of whether the state
owns more than 50% of the shares on dividends paid. However, this positive relation
34We follow Chen et al. (2018), to check the relevance of the instruments by conducting an F-test
and the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk LM test. The significant F-stat in the two models rejects the
null hypothesis that the instrument does not explain state ownership. Similarly the Kleibergen-Paap
rk LM test rejects the null that the model is under-identified. Both the tests are significant at 1%
level.
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is consistent with both the hypotheses we propose: reputation and income. We next
implement empirical tests that enable us to discern between the economic importances
of these two explanations. While the models presented in Panels A, B, and C of Table
6 test the validity of the reputation hypothesis, models in Panels A, B, and C of Table
7 test the income hypothesis.
We test the reputation hypothesis in three ways: While all privatized firms may
benefit from a reputation of fair treatment to minority shareholders, states in civil law
countries are likely to have higher incentives. La Porta et al. (2000) state that ‘A
reputation for good treatment of shareholders is worth most in countries with weak
legal protection of minority shareholders’. Therefore, we posit that the state, espe-
cially when it holds a majority of the voting shares, in a weak minority shareholder
rights setting, may induce management to pay out sufficient dividends to build a rep-
utation of fair treatment of its minority shareholders.35 In other words, we propose
that partially privatized firms in civil law countries are likely to pay higher dividends,
especially if the state has majority shareholdings. To test this argument, we include
a time invariant COMMONLAW dummy (La Porta et al., 2000) and an interaction
between COMMONLAW and REVENUE_NEW in our regression models. The results
are reported in Panel A of Table 6. Model 1 shows that the coefficient (0.635) for
REVENUE_NEW is positive and significant, suggesting that in civil law countries,
revenue type privatized firms pay higher dividends than control type privatized firms.
The insignificant coefficient (-0.138) for COMMONLAW suggests there is no significant
difference in dividends by control type privatized firms in common law verses civil law
countries. Last, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, we find a significant negative coefficient
(-0.558) for the interaction term, which indicates that the revenue type privatized firms,
in comparison with control type privatized firms, pay even lower dividends in common
than in civil law countries. In Models 2 through 5, we check the robustness of this find-
ing by extending the model to include a full set of control variables and by using the
other measures of dividends as the dependent variable. The results remain practically
unchanged. We consider these findings to be consistent with the reputation hypothesis.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
35In a similar line of argument, Gomes (2000) shows that large block holders of shares may choose
to not expropriate minority shareholders and rather build up a reputation of treating minority share-
holders well.
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In Panel B of Table 6, we replace the COMMONLAW dummy with the rule of
law variable (La Porta et al., 2000; Kaufmann et al., 2016). Unlike COMMONLAW,
the RULELAW is time-varying. This allows our inference to control for country fixed
effects, alongside year and industry fixed effects. Similar to the earlier argument, we
expect that revenue type privatized firms in countries with weak rule of law to pro-
tect minority shareholders, to pay higher dividends. The findings are consistent with
those reported in Panel A of Table 6. We find a significant positive coefficient on
REVENUE_NEW, an insignificant coefficient on RULELAW, and a significant nega-
tive coefficient for the interaction between the two. Last, we check the robustness of
these findings by using the time invariant anti-self-dealing index (SHAREHOLDER-
RIGHT), a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders, proposed by Djankov
et al. (2008). The findings, reported in Panel C of Table 6, are qualitatively the same:
revenue type privatized firms pay higher dividends in countries with lower legal protec-
tion of minority shareholders against expropriation. Therefore, we conclude that our
findings, represented in Table 6, are consistent with the reputation hypothesis.
We next check the validity of the income hypothesis. We begin with considering the
political ideological orientation of the state. We distinguish between the left-wing and
right-wing governments. While right-wing governments are likely to be more market-
oriented, left-wing governments are likely to have a preference for retaining control
of a privatized firm, which limits its ability to raise cash flows via capital market
transactions. Therefore, according to the income hypothesis, dividends are likely to
be higher in left-wing oriented political regimes, especially if the state has majority
shareholding in the firm because that would give the state a larger influence on the
firm’s dividend policies. We test the hypothesis by including a LEFTWING dummy
variable in our regression models. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7.
Model 1 includes REVENUE_NEW, LEFTWING, and the interaction between the
two. While we still find a significant positive coefficient (0.128) for REVENUE_NEW,
we find no statistical significance for the coefficients on LEFTWING and the interaction
term. As a result, our finding is contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 3. In Model
2, when we include a full set of control variables, this main finding remains unchanged.
We replace the DIV/SALES with other measure of dividends as the dependent variable
and find very similar results in Models 3, 4, and 5. These findings are inconsistent with
the explanation that states use higher dividends as a way of extracting income from
partially privatized firms.
We next test the income hypothesis by examining the national deficit, defined as a
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ratio of the outstanding debt and GDP. Borisova and Megginson (2011) suggest that
significant revenues from share issue privatizations ‘could induce governments to sell
greater portions of their holdings, particularly if a large national deficit needs trimming’.
In a similar vein, a government that is cash-strapped is more likely to use dividends
by partially privatized firms as a source of income, especially if it has majority share-
holdings. Therefore, we test for an association between dividends and NATIONALD-
EFICIT, especially for revenue type firms. The results are reported in Panel B of Table
7. Model 1 with DIV/SALES as the dependent variable, includes REVENUE_NEW,
NATIONALDEFICIT, and the interaction between those two variables. While the in-
come hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on the NATIONALDEFICIT and the
interaction term, we find statistically insignificant coefficients on both. In Model 2,
when we include a full set of control variables, our main finding remains unchanged. It
again refutes the income hypothesis. Like before the findings for alternate measure of
dividends, reported in Models 3 through 5, are very similar.
We give income hypothesis another chance to explain high dividends of privatized
firms, by including both the LEFTWING and NATIONALDEFICIT in the same model.
Using a triple interaction term, REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING * NATIONALD-
EFICIT, we check whether cash-strapped, revenue type privatized firms controlled by
left-wing oriented states pay higher dividends. We find no such association in any of
the models, as presented in Panel C of Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 about here.]
Although the results discussed in the previous section were consistent with both the
reputation and income hypotheses, we tested each hypothesis individually by imple-
menting different tests. Our findings are strongly in favor of the reputation explanation
and refute the income explanation. In the next section, we check whether alternative
explanations such as life-cycle theory or tax implications can explain our findings.
5. Alternative explanations and additional discussion
In this section we perform additional tests and check for alternative theories that
can explain our findings. In particular, we consider whether the higher dividends by
privatized firms can be accounted for by life-cycle/ financial maturity explanations for
dividends (Fama and French, 2001; Grullon et al., 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006). Our
findings on the interlinked life-cycle and maturity explanations for higher dividends
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of privatized firms are mixed, with most results indicating the relative unimportance
of this cadre of explanation for our sample of privatized companies. For instance, we
test whether privatized firms are in a mature financial life-cycle phase. As companies
move from the growth phase to a more mature phase of their financial life-cycles, their
investment opportunity sets start to contract and they experience reductions in capital
spending, which can make them better candidates for distributing retained earnings to
shareholders (Fama and French, 2001; Grullon et al., 2002). We examine the change
in total assets and growth opportunities of privatized companies and find results that
refute this prediction. Not only do total assets increase significantly after privatization,
but so do sales and earnings: this is evidence of newly privatized firms entering a
growth phase of their financial life-cycles.36 To test the DeAngelo et al. (2006) version
of the life-cycle/ financial maturity hypothesis, we include the retained earnings to total
equity (RETE) ratio in all our regressions models. While the coefficient for RETE is
positive as predicted by the theory, it is statistically significant only about half the
time. Therefore, we consider our findings to be mixed with regard to the life-cycle
explanation of dividends. However, the use of RETE as a proxy for the life-cycle theory
has recently come under scrutiny (Banyi and Kahle, 2014). To further investigate the
issue, we replace the RETE variable with firm age to proxy for the life cycle of a firm.
The findings are reported in Panel A of Table 8. To the extent that firm age can proxy
for the life-cycle stage, we find no evidence supporting the theory. The coefficient for the
natural log of age is either statistically insignificant (Models 3 and 6) or has a negative
sign (Models 1, 2, 4, and 5). The coefficients on REVENUE_NEW and various proxies
for shareholder protection rights, on the other hand, remain significant. Therefore, we
do not think life-cycle theory is the explanation for our findings.
[Insert Table 8 about here.]
We next check whether the presence of a control variable for the country’s level
of dividend tax penalty has an impact on our main findings. It is possible that the
variation internationally, and over time, in the relative taxation of dividends and capital
gains can influence the dividend payment decision of privatized companies. Therefore,
we include a dividend tax penalty (TAXPENALTY) variable attributable to Poterba
and Summers (1984). The results are reported in Panel B of Table 8. The coefficient
36See Appendix C for detail.
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for TAXPENALTY is statistically insignificant in all models while the main results
hold across all models.37 In short, the findings cannot be explained by variation in
international dividend taxes.
6. Conclusion
We use a unique hand-collected sample of 191 privatized firms (2,119 firm years) to
map the extent of state ownership in privatized firms throughout our sample period.
We hypothesize that a reputation mechanism, to allay the expropriation concerns of
minority shareholders, and/or an income mechanism, to extract cash to supplement
state income, can explain the high dividends of privatized firms. The two mechanisms
relate to prospective agency conflict between the state and minority shareholders. These
explanations, for the high dividends of privatized firms, have greater credibility the
greater the extent of state ownership in the privatized firms. Consistent with both
explanations, we find that state ownership is positively related to cash dividends. This
result is invariant to a variety of measures of cash dividends paid (dividend-to-sales
ratio, the natural logarithm of dividends, dividend-to-earnings ratio, and dividends-to-
total assets ratio), endogeneity tests, and a large set of control variables.
We, in addition, discern between the relative empirical importance of the reputation
and income explanations of privatized firms’ high dividends. We show that the divi-
dends of revenue type privatizations (i.e. where the state retains a majority shareholding
in the privatized firm) vary inversely with proxies for the level of minority shareholder
protection internationally (La Porta et al., 2000, 1998; Djankov et al., 2008; Kaufmann
et al., 2016), to an even greater extent than control type privatizations (i.e. where
the state retains a minority shareholding in the privatized firm). To the extent that
the reputation hypothesis is unimportant, the dividends of revenue type privatizations
should be independent of or positively associated with minority shareholder protection.
We also show that the political ideology of the state (Biais and Perotti, 2002; Ben-Nasr
et al., 2012) is independent of the dividends of privatized firms. A left-wing political
orientation of the state can imply an aversion towards the concession of control of a
privatized firm to the market. This, in turn, impedes the state from generating income
by transactions in the capital market. Finally, we show that governments with a large
national deficit don’t appear to extract fiscal income by way of dividends, even when
37If we alternatively use the dividend tax penalty variable of Jacob and Jacob (2013) we obtain
substantively the same result. The results are available from the authors on request.
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such governments have a left-wing political orientation. Our findings suggest the rela-
tive importance of the state’s reputation with minority shareholders to account for the
high dividends of privatized firms.
The prevalence around the world of partially privatized and fully state-owned com-
panies, and the absence of an empirical basis for predicting the impact that altered
state ownership will have on listed firm dividends, highlights the importance of our
study. In identifying the empirical relevance of a reputation hypothesis to account for
the high dividends of privatized firms we provide the first credible explanation for these
high dividends.
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Table 1: Change in firm dividends around privatization and difference in dividends for privatized vs. non-
privatized firms: Univariate analysis 
Panel A reports univariate analysis of dividends around the event of privatization. Specifically, it reports various 
dividend measures for privatized firms during 3 years before and 3 years after privatization. N refers to the number of 
firms observed for the variable. In Panel A, we require firms to have at least 2 consecutive years of data both before 
and after privatization. Consequently, the firms included for this analysis are privatized between 1992 and 2011. 
Expected Change refers to the anticipated change in the proxy dividend variable after privatization. Sign refers to the 
expected sign of the difference in mean and median proxy variable values from before to after privatization. Proportion 
refers to the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as expected, as well as a test of significance of this change 
(Z-statistics). Before and After refer to the mean and median values of the proxy variables for the 3-year periods before 
and after privatization. Difference refers to the difference in mean and median values for Before and After. Panel B 
reports comparison of dividend measures for privatized and non-privatized firms used in this study from 1990 through 
2013. N is the number of firm-years observed for the variable. Mean and median are the arithmetic average and median 
value for each dividend variable. We use the two-sample mean-comparison test (T-statistics) and the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test (Z-statistics) to test the significance of differences in mean and median values, respectively. Please refer to 
Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables.  
 
Panel A: Changes in dividends around privatization 
  Expected Change Mean Median 
 N Sign Proportion Before After Difference Before After Difference 
Payout                   
DIV 120 (+) 0.792 a 103.835 209.471 105.635 a 17.793 37.270 19.478 a 
DIV/SALES 120 (+) 0.683 a 0.031 0.044 0.014 a 0.013 0.027 0.014 a 
DIV/EBIT 116 (+) 0.698 a 0.220 0.356 0.136 c 0.126 0.239 0.113 a 
DIV/TOTALASSETS 120 (+) 0.708 a 0.016 0.025 0.009 a 0.008 0.016 0.008 a 
 
 
Panel B: Dividends for privatized vs. non-privatized firms 
 Privatized Firms Non-Privatized Firms Difference in 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median 
Payout                 
DIV 3230 306.830 39.750 77437 40.568 1.180 266.262 a 38.570 a 
DIV/SALES 3228 0.276 0.299 75428 0.081 0.063 0.195 a 0.236 a 
DIV/EBIT 2923 0.477 0.550 60122 0.233 0.282 0.244 a 0.268 a 
DIV/TOTALASSETS 3230 0.233 0.251 77352 0.072 0.060 0.161 a 0.190 a 
 
a, b, and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2: Relation between privatization event and dividends around the privatization event 
This Table reports regression models that test for an association between the privatization event and dividends. We use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach and find a matching non-
privatized firm for each privatized firm. The matching is performed using the same year of listing, country of origin, firm’s total assets, cash holdings, and growth in total assets. For this 
multivariate analysis, we limit the sample from 3 years before to 3 years after listing and require the firm to have at least 2 year of data both before and after privatization. As a result, the sample 
size of privatized firms is smaller in this Table. PVT is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for privatized firms and 0 for non-privatized firms. After is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 during 
post-listing years and 0 otherwise. PVT_After refers to the interaction between the two dummy variables. The dependent variable in Models 1-3 is DIV/SALES.  We test the robustness of the 
findings, in Models 4-6, by using different dependent variables (Ln (1+DIV), DIV/EBIT, and DIV/TOTALASSETS) to capture dividends. We control for the firm-level and industry-level fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Values under Coeff correspond to the regression coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated 
using robust standard errors at the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables. 
 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
             
PVT 0.123 0.007           
After   -0.859 0.068 -0.799 0.028 -0.394 0.401 -1.327 0.009 -0.634 0.027 
PVT_After   1.189 0.009 0.962 0.005 1.176 0.021 1.358 0.006 0.813 0.004 
CLOSE     0.662 0.051 0.883 0.018 0.426 0.371 0.618 0.009 
CASH     0.393 0.363 0.223 0.634 0.113 0.858 0.090 0.781 
LEVERAGE     -2.173 0.001 -2.864 0.000 -5.206 0.000 -2.119 0.000 
RETE     0.001 0.994 0.027 0.792 0.349 0.206 0.031 0.682 
EARNINGS     1.155 0.170 2.303 0.061 -3.211 0.153 2.413 0.020 
ABNORMALEARNING     0.007 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.025 0.007 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES     0.067 0.496 0.131 0.382 0.205 0.289 0.080 0.586 
ASSETGROWTH     -0.189 0.111 -0.323 0.051 -0.091 0.835 -0.390 0.051 
SALESGROWTH     -0.294 0.074 -0.122 0.068 -0.842 0.100 -0.078 0.142 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)     0.136 0.088 0.935 0.000 0.233 0.029 0.073 0.255 
INCOMERISK     -1.676 0.474 -3.202 0.270 -6.726 0.135 -0.122 0.959 
CATERING     0.185 0.256 0.282 0.164 0.072 0.763 0.178 0.176 
GDPGROWTH     -3.812 0.095 -2.836 0.380 -6.946 0.095 -4.099 0.076 
YEAR     0.021 0.065 0.004 0.092 0.071 0.008 0.005 0.089 
Constant 0.103 0.000 2.353 0.000 2.137 0.008 -2.486 0.002 5.324 0.000 2.202 0.000 
Observation 578   578   578   578   522   578   
Firms 190  190  190  190  182  190  
Rsq. Overall 0.455  0.101  0.175  0.523  0.170  0.233  
Firm fixed effects No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  No  No  No  No  No  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   No   No   No   No   No   
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Table 3: Relation between privatization and dividends using the full sample 
This Table reports results for regression models using all privatized and non-privatized firms in our sample during 
1990 to 2013. In Models 1 and 2, DIV/SALES is used as the dependent variable. We test the robustness of the 
findings, in Models 3-5, using different dependent variables to capture dividends. PVT is a dummy variable that 
is equal to 1 for privatized firms and 0 for non-privatized firms. To reduce the endogeneity problem the 
independent variables, except for the time invariant dummy (PVT) and YEAR, are lagged by one year.  We control 
for the firm-level industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Values under Coeff 
correspond to the regression coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value 
calculated using robust standard errors at the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all 
variables. 
 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
PVT 0.180 0.000 0.156 0.000 1.328 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.140 0.000 
CLOSE   -0.021 0.023 -0.236 0.000 -0.046 0.017 -0.034 0.001 
CASH   0.043 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.007 0.233 0.017 0.000 
LEVERAGE   -0.094 0.000 -1.265 0.000 -0.214 0.000 -0.097 0.000 
RETE   0.004 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.000 
EARNINGS   0.015 0.000 -0.001 0.849 0.106 0.000 0.001 0.406 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.204 0.002 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.002 0.794 0.002 0.077 0.004 0.039 0.015 0.359 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.001 0.269 -0.082 0.000 0.001 0.869 0.000 0.684 
SALESGROWTH   -0.003 0.002 -0.019 0.024 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.050 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   0.012 0.000 0.598 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.008 0.000 
INCOMERISK   -0.013 0.099 0.134 0.000 -0.094 0.059 -0.001 0.672 
CATERING   -0.001 0.135 -0.054 0.000 -0.002 0.243 -0.002 0.003 
GDPGROWTH   0.083 0.000 1.972 0.000 0.033 0.447 0.107 0.000 
YEAR   0.004 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.024 0.006 0.000 
Constant 0.061 0.007 0.005 0.814 -2.427 0.000 0.011 0.663 0.017 0.262 
Observation 52326   52326   52624   38197   52600   
Firms 5074  5074  5087  4628  5087  
Rsq. overall 0.217  0.335  0.636  0.263  0.304  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Table 4: Relation between state ownership and dividends of privatized firms 
This Table reports results for panel regressions that use only privatized firms to test for a relation between the extent of state ownership and dividends.  Once a firm was privatized, we tracked 
news articles, among other sources, that show whether the state has majority (>50%) shareholdings or not during the post-privatization years throughout our sample period. We were able to 
gather information on 191 privatized firms.  REVENUE_NEW, a dummy variable, is equal to 1 in a particular year if the state owns more than 50% shares at the end of that fiscal year and 0 
otherwise. FOREIGN and INSTITUTIONAL are dummy variables that, respectively, indicate a presence of foreign or institutional investor in the firm’s ownership structure. The dependent 
variable in Model 1 through Model 4 is DIV/SALES. In Models 5, 6, and 7, we re-test Model 4 using Ln (1+DIV), DIV/EBIT, and DIV/TOTALASSETS as the dependent variables, respectively. 
To reduce the endogeneity problem the independent variables, except for the time invariant dummies (FOREIGN and INSTITUTIONAL) and YEAR, are lagged by one year.  We control for 
the firm-level industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Values under Coeff correspond to the regression coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance 
of the Z-value calculated using robust standard errors at the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables. 
 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
               
REVENUE_NEW 0.146 0.002 0.135 0.006 0.131 0.008 0.145 0.002 1.362 0.000 0.094 0.080 0.094 0.003 
FOREIGN   0.121 0.095 0.120 0.098 0.144 0.048 0.867 0.000 -1.777 0.321 0.083 0.023 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.028 0.706 0.033 0.662 0.063 0.447 0.617 0.000 1.380 0.298 0.084 0.002 
CLOSE     0.067 0.538 0.055 0.579 0.439 0.038 -0.137 0.225 0.008 0.832 
CASH       0.455 0.018 0.388 0.116 0.170 0.188 0.183 0.004 
LEVERAGE       -0.439 0.006 -2.318 0.000 -0.763 0.000 -0.194 0.008 
RETE       0.023 0.059 0.180 0.003 0.015 0.178 0.020 0.073 
EARNINGS       1.013 0.002 4.281 0.000 -0.265 0.429 1.250 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING       0.001 0.968 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.823 0.002 0.005 
SALES/EMPLOYEES       0.010 0.044 0.041 0.042 0.016 0.052 0.060 0.015 
ASSETGROWTH       -0.233 0.072 -0.098 0.072 -0.105 0.113 -0.074 0.025 
SALESGROWTH       -0.304 0.077 -0.198 0.055 -0.094 0.088 -0.060 0.064 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)       0.027 0.229 0.700 0.000 0.039 0.333 0.023 0.026 
INCOMERISK       -0.158 0.609 0.002 0.999 0.778 0.620 0.766 0.011 
CATERING       0.058 0.260 -0.015 0.830 -0.028 0.424 0.022 0.109 
GDPGROWTH       -0.242 0.707 3.126 0.054 -0.910 0.111 0.828 0.072 
YEAR       0.004 0.040 0.025 0.008 0.005 0.036 0.002 0.052 
Constant 0.205 0.375 0.083 0.638 0.097 0.641 -0.044 0.863 -3.902 0.000 0.362 0.677 -0.032 0.782 
Observation 2119  2119  2119  2119  2120  1824  2120  
Firms 191  191  191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. overall 0.220  0.222  0.222  0.287  0.691  0.109  0.428  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Table 5: Mitigating endogeneity in the relation between state ownership and dividends of privatized firms 
This Table reports the results for the Instrumental Variable Two-Stage Least Squares (IV2SLS) in Model 1 and Heckman (1979) 
sample selection model in Model 2. REVENUE_NEW is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in a particular year if the state owns 
more than 50% shares at the end of that fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Similar to Table 4, in Model 1 these regressions include 191 
privatized firms for the 1990 to 2013 period. Results for both Stage 1 and Stage 2 of the IV2SLS and Heckman model are reported. 
Model 1 instruments REVENUE_NEW using the national deficit at the end of the fiscal year. In Model 2, Heckman sample selection 
model controls for the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda). In the first stage, we use a Probit model to predict whether governments retain 
control over the privatized firms after listing by controlling for the TOTALGOVHOLDING of 101 European privatized firms for 
which the data are available from Privatization Barometer. In particular, we regress REVENUE_NEW on national deficit at the end 
of the fiscal year, and the full set of control variables. To avoid multicollinearity, we exclude CLOSE from the Heckman sample 
selection model.  We control for the firm-level industry fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Values under Coeff correspond to the 
regression coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated using robust standard errors at 
the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables. 
 
 
    Model 1   Model 2 
Dependent Variables →  REVENUE_NEW DIV_Sales  REVENUE_NEW DIV_Sales 
Independent Variables ↓  Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 1 Stage 2 
    Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. 
P-
Val. 
  Coeff. P-Val. Coeff. 
P-
Val. 
           
NATIONALDEFICIT  -0.158 0.006    -0.687 0.001   
REVENUE_NEW    0.943 0.013      
TOTALGOVHOLDING       6.585 0.000 0.486 0.000 
FOREIGN  0.187 0.000 0.242 0.007  -0.246 0.078 0.097 0.006 
INSTITUTIONAL  0.116 0.002 0.154 0.015  0.578 0.000 0.075 0.029 
CLOSE  0.394 0.000 0.399 0.000      
CASH  0.522 0.000 0.616 0.029  0.076 0.080 0.322 0.000 
LEVERAGE  0.339 0.001 0.345 0.068  0.204 0.615 -0.112 0.092 
RETE  0.022 0.245 0.035 0.055  -0.504 0.000 -0.032 0.415 
EARNINGS  1.599 0.000 1.010 0.067  0.169 0.840 2.260 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING  -0.001 0.071 0.005 0.000  0.001 0.764 0.009 0.050 
SALES/EMPLOYEES  -0.009 0.466 0.026 0.090  0.053 0.382 0.064 0.001 
ASSETGROWTH  -0.237 0.287 -0.191 0.092  0.142 0.672 0.093 0.279 
SALESGROWTH  0.288 0.072 -0.246 0.085  -0.441 0.157 -0.103 0.063 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)  -0.060 0.000 -0.029 0.338  0.051 0.198 -0.003 0.750 
INCOMERISK  -1.416 0.000 -1.538 0.028  -2.147 0.287 0.866 0.065 
CATERING  0.118 0.000 -0.020 0.718  -0.059 0.643 -0.029 0.312 
GDPGROWTH  -0.066 0.894 1.630 0.004  0.124 0.960 0.215 0.711 
YEAR  0.005 0.047 0.011 0.002  -0.035 0.002 0.007 0.003 
Constant  0.370 0.000 0.559 0.001  -3.438 0.000 -0.177 0.285 
Lambda         0.145 0.023 
Observation   2119   2119     1433   1433   
Firms  191  191   101  101  
Adjusted Rsq.  0.127     0.655    
Ind. fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM                     
Chi-sq  7.62     255.66    
P-Value  0.006     0.000    
Excluded Instrument 
Test 
          
F-Stat  16.59         
Probability   0.000                 
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Table 6: Relation between state ownership and dividends of privatized firms in light of minority shareholder protection 
This Table reports results for panel regression models for 191 privatized firms during 1990 through 2013. Using three different proxies for minority shareholder protection, we empirically test 
the predictions of our reputation hypothesis. In Panel A, we report the results for the common law dummy (COMMONLAW), in Panel B, we report the results for the effectiveness and 
enforcement of law and order in a country (RULELAW) and in Panel C we report the results for the minority shareholder protection in a country (SHAREHOLDERRIGHT). Across the three 
panels, in Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is DIV/SALES. In Models 3, 4, and 5, we re-test Model 2 using Ln (1+DIV), DIV/EBIT, and DIV/TOTALASSETS as the dependent variables, 
respectively. To reduce the endogeneity problem the independent variables, except for the time invariant dummies (COMMONLAW, SHAREHOLDERRIGHT, FOREIGN, and 
INSTITUTIONAL) and YEAR, are lagged by one year.  We control for the firm-level industry fixed effects and year fixed effects across all the models, and country fixed effects for the models 
in Panel B. Values under Coeff correspond to the regression coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated using robust standard errors at the firm-
level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables.  
 
Panel A (Governance - COMMONLAW) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
REVENUE_NEW 0.635 0.008 0.598 0.013 0.651 0.012 0.249 0.000 0.232 0.012 
COMMONLAW -0.138 0.324 -0.190 0.252 -0.406 0.092 0.695 0.351 -0.006 0.891 
REVENUE_NEW * COMMONLAW -0.558 0.011 -0.522 0.011 -0.602 0.014 -0.026 0.087 -0.175 0.022 
FOREIGN   0.216 0.006 0.940 0.000 -0.978 0.329 0.101 0.003 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.085 0.364 0.717 0.000 1.253 0.331 0.117 0.000 
CLOSE   0.096 0.339 -0.519 0.010 -0.149 0.192 0.001 0.974 
CASH   0.442 0.024 0.425 0.079 0.114 0.435 0.174 0.005 
LEVERAGE   -0.369 0.020 -2.111 0.000 -0.834 0.000 -0.164 0.019 
RETE   0.021 0.284 0.176 0.005 -0.015 0.539 0.020 0.139 
EARNINGS   1.011 0.002 4.180 0.000 -0.157 0.514 1.249 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.010 0.040 0.301 0.000 0.026 0.006 0.028 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.010 0.042 0.040 0.044 0.013 0.056 0.062 0.015 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.217 0.032 -0.099 0.057 -0.061 0.048 -0.067 0.013 
SALESGROWTH   0.309 0.301 0.219 0.166 0.049 0.649 -0.061 0.024 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   -0.041 0.056 0.703 0.000 0.048 0.239 -0.028 0.003 
INCOMERISK   -0.280 0.392 -0.478 0.780 0.765 0.491 0.703 0.019 
CATERING   0.067 0.009 0.012 0.869 -0.018 0.552 0.028 0.029 
GDPGROWTH   -0.208 0.716 2.199 0.142 -0.232 0.806 0.600 0.126 
YEAR   0.004 0.042 0.018 0.020 0.009 0.015 0.001 0.069 
Constant 0.353 0.029 0.260 0.271 -3.588 0.000 -1.314 0.308 0.002 0.981 
Observation 2119   2119   2120   1824   2120   
Firms 191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. overall 0.144  0.225  0.660  0.102  0.401  
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Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects No   No   No   No   No   
 
 
Panel B (Governance - RULELAW) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
REVENUE_NEW 0.184 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.385 0.004 0.116 0.046 0.107 0.001 
RULELAW 0.159 0.161 0.075 0.501 0.321 0.535 -0.159 0.229 0.073 0.361 
REVENUE_NEW * RULELAW -0.129 0.001 -0.118 0.002 -0.222 0.000 -0.078 0.054 -0.051 0.001 
FOREIGN   0.154 0.034 0.883 0.000 -1.772 0.322 0.087 0.017 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.073 0.384 0.640 0.000 1.383 0.297 0.089 0.001 
CLOSE   0.088 0.371 0.379 0.073 -0.109 0.294 0.022 0.540 
CASH   0.454 0.017 0.386 0.114 0.168 0.200 0.183 0.004 
LEVERAGE   -0.380 0.017 -2.173 0.000 -0.743 0.000 -0.167 0.024 
RETE   0.021 0.288 0.175 0.006 0.014 0.363 0.019 0.163 
EARNINGS   0.977 0.002 4.228 0.000 -0.289 0.398 1.232 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.001 0.094 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.079 0.002 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.011 0.041 0.042 0.041 0.015 0.053 0.059 0.015 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.244 0.026 -0.121 0.049 -0.101 0.024 -0.079 0.007 
SALESGROWTH   -0.314 0.058 0.212 0.184 0.099 0.328 -0.063 0.045 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   -0.027 0.215 0.698 0.000 0.040 0.324 -0.023 0.027 
INCOMERISK   -0.244 0.398 -0.106 0.949 0.688 0.654 0.736 0.012 
CATERING   0.056 0.030 -0.021 0.768 -0.027 0.421 0.021 0.124 
GDPGROWTH   -0.308 0.640 2.873 0.077 -0.810 0.165 0.772 0.079 
YEAR   0.002 0.065 0.021 0.014 0.004 0.046 0.001 0.074 
Constant 0.230 0.207 0.015 0.952 -3.710 0.000 0.306 0.725 0.009 0.934 
Observation 2119   2119   2120   1824   2120   
Firms 191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. overall 0.240  0.301  0.695  0.111  0.436  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Panel C (Governance – SHAREHOLDERRIGHT) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
REVENUE_NEW 0.184 0.012 0.162 0.015 -0.369 0.042 0.121 0.065 0.147 0.081 
SHAREHOLDERRIGHT 0.089 0.003 0.084 0.008 0.045 0.576 0.744 0.322 0.039 0.006 
REVENUE_NEW * SHAREHOLDERRIGHT -0.177 0.000 -0.106 0.005 -0.292 0.017 -0.095 0.087 -0.110 0.000 
FOREIGN   0.159 0.039 0.857 0.000 -0.776 0.365 0.089 0.006 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.111 0.228 0.771 0.000 1.142 0.300 0.121 0.000 
CLOSE   0.077 0.435 -0.569 0.004 -0.131 0.241 0.002 0.995 
CASH   0.434 0.028 0.409 0.090 0.169 0.192 0.122 0.006 
LEVERAGE   -0.379 0.018 -2.081 0.000 -0.738 0.000 -0.172 0.013 
RETE   0.023 0.238 0.179 0.005 0.013 0.394 0.021 0.125 
EARNINGS   0.999 0.002 4.218 0.000 -0.251 0.449 1.238 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.005 0.071 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.078 0.003 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.009 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.017 0.047 0.062 0.016 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.216 0.032 -0.092 0.060 -0.093 0.025 -0.069 0.013 
SALESGROWTH   0.309 0.302 0.221 0.167 -0.086 0.038 0.062 0.241 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   -0.048 0.035 0.691 0.000 0.025 0.458 -0.030 0.003 
INCOMERISK   -0.383 0.255 -0.554 0.748 0.799 0.611 0.671 0.025 
CATERING   0.071 0.005 0.016 0.821 -0.022 0.494 0.031 0.019 
GDPGROWTH   -0.111 0.846 2.658 0.070 -0.899 0.110 0.585 0.112 
YEAR   0.005 0.033 0.019 0.018 0.007 0.023 0.001 0.064 
Constant -0.070 0.674 -0.124 0.518 -4.016 0.000 -3.130 0.329 -0.052 0.585 
Observation 2119   2119   2120   1824   2120   
Firms 191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. overall 0.125  0.204  0.656  0.103  0.397  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects No   No   No   No   No   
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Table 7: Relation between state ownership and dividends of privatized firms in light of political orientation and national deficit  
This Table reports results for panel regression models for 191 privatized firms during 1990 through 2013. The models in this Table empirically test the predictions of our income hypothesis. In 
Panel A, we report the results for the political orientation in a country (LEFTWING), in Panel B, we report the results for the national deficit in a country (NATIONALDEFICIT) and in Panel 
C we report the results for the joint effect of the political orientation and the national deficit in a country (LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT). Across the three panels, DIV/SALES is the 
dependent variable in Models 1 and 2. In Models 3, 4, and 5, we re-test Model 2 using Ln (1+DIV), DIV/EBIT, and DIV/TOTALASSETS as the dependent variables, respectively. To reduce 
the endogeneity problem the independent variables, except for the time invariant dummies (COMMONLAW, SHAREHOLDERRIGHT, FOREIGN, and INSTITUTIONAL) and YEAR, are 
lagged by one year.  We control for the firm-level industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects across all the models. Values under Coeff correspond to the regression 
coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated using robust standard errors at the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all 
variables. 
 
Panel A (Political Orientation - LEFTWING) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
REVENUE_NEW 0.128 0.020 0.136 0.010 0.785 0.000 0.109 0.058 0.106 0.002 
LEFTWING -0.066 0.116 -0.072 0.089 -0.095 0.495 -0.015 0.632 -0.005 0.794 
REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING 0.050 0.436 0.026 0.666 0.153 0.446 -0.040 0.430 -0.032 0.406 
FOREIGN   0.147 0.043 0.864 0.000 -1.769 0.323 0.085 0.017 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.062 0.462 0.612 0.000 1.381 0.297 0.084 0.002 
CLOSE   0.061 0.539 0.436 0.035 -0.132 0.245 0.010 0.795 
CASH   0.453 0.019 0.385 0.122 0.170 0.190 0.183 0.004 
LEVERAGE   -0.439 0.007 -2.298 0.000 -0.774 0.000 -0.201 0.008 
RETE   0.023 0.228 0.180 0.005 0.015 0.374 0.020 0.143 
EARNINGS   1.028 0.001 4.299 0.000 -0.278 0.403 1.248 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.001 0.092 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.079 0.002 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.012 0.037 0.044 0.038 0.015 0.053 0.060 0.014 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.233 0.028 -0.099 0.057 -0.108 0.022 -0.074 0.010 
SALESGROWTH   -0.309 0.060 0.199 0.221 0.101 0.326 -0.062 0.047 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   -0.027 0.214 0.700 0.000 0.039 0.347 -0.023 0.025 
INCOMERISK   -0.104 0.744 0.019 0.991 0.836 0.595 0.788 0.011 
CATERING   0.054 0.042 -0.021 0.768 -0.029 0.412 0.022 0.119 
GDPGROWTH   -0.252 0.692 3.114 0.053 -0.916 0.109 0.827 0.073 
YEAR   0.004 0.036 0.025 0.007 0.006 0.357 0.002 0.051 
Constant 0.145 0.444 -0.013 0.959 -3.850 0.000 0.367 0.673 -0.033 0.780 
Observation 2119   2119   2120   1824   2120   
Firms 191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. Overall 0.220  0.287  0.691  0.111  0.429  
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Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
 
 
Panel B (National Deficit - NATIONALDEFICIT) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
REVENUE_NEW 0.205 0.051 0.175 0.092 0.820 0.001 0.181 0.036 0.153 0.015 
NATIONALDEFICIT 0.050 0.745 0.174 0.313 0.496 0.315 0.036 0.795 0.027 0.778 
REVENUE_NEW * NATIONALDEFICIT -0.094 0.488 -0.060 0.655 0.477 0.259 0.002 0.983 0.023 0.845 
FOREIGN   0.146 0.044 0.876 0.000 -1.776 0.321 0.082 0.023 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.066 0.433 0.627 0.000 1.382 0.298 0.084 0.002 
CLOSE   0.061 0.547 0.438 0.035 -0.135 0.242 0.008 0.833 
CASH   0.455 0.018 0.411 0.094 0.170 0.189 0.185 0.004 
LEVERAGE   -0.454 0.004 -2.391 0.000 -0.767 0.000 -0.187 0.012 
RETE   0.023 0.229 0.180 0.005 0.015 0.361 0.020 0.149 
EARNINGS   1.004 0.002 4.261 0.000 -0.268 0.422 1.271 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.002 0.086 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.081 0.002 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.011 0.043 0.044 0.036 0.015 0.053 0.061 0.013 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.234 0.028 -0.101 0.056 -0.105 0.022 -0.074 0.010 
SALESGROWTH   -0.308 0.061 0.207 0.202 0.095 0.351 -0.060 0.050 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   -0.027 0.215 0.691 0.000 0.038 0.343 -0.023 0.022 
INCOMERISK   -0.185 0.569 -0.062 0.972 0.776 0.624 0.779 0.012 
CATERING   0.057 0.028 -0.018 0.804 -0.028 0.425 0.022 0.112 
GDPGROWTH   -0.008 0.990 3.908 0.009 -0.863 0.161 0.871 0.039 
YEAR   0.003 0.054 0.020 0.016 0.005 0.375 0.001 0.059 
Constant 0.099 0.669 -0.139 0.602 -4.196 0.000 0.347 0.690 -0.050 0.687 
Observation 2119   2119   2120   1824   2120   
Firms 191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. overall 0.222  0.288  0.692  0.109  0.429  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Panel C (Political Orientation and National Deficit - LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
REVENUE_NEW 0.180 0.014 0.150 0.019 0.311 0.032 0.048 0.058 0.135 0.032 
LEFTWING -0.143 0.039 -0.180 0.021 -0.373 0.028 -0.075 0.098 -0.154 0.021 
NATIONALDEFICIT 0.019 0.895 0.135 0.411 0.378 0.496 -0.002 0.987 0.034 0.708 
REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING 0.077 0.681 0.074 0.656 0.314 0.482 0.124 0.382 -0.185 0.160 
REVENUE_NEW * NATIONALDEFICIT -0.081 0.545 -0.036 0.776 0.554 0.281 0.090 0.428 -0.047 0.554 
LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT 0.113 0.495 0.152 0.316 0.383 0.305 0.088 0.264 0.000 0.999 
REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT -0.041 0.850 -0.068 0.722 -0.231 0.664 -0.238 0.206 0.220 0.209 
FOREIGN   0.150 0.038 0.877 0.000 -1.768 0.323 0.085 0.016 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.063 0.450 0.620 0.000 1.381 0.298 0.086 0.001 
CLOSE   0.070 0.486 -0.423 0.036 -0.125 0.277 0.006 0.867 
CASH   0.454 0.018 0.409 0.095 0.171 0.189 0.185 0.004 
LEVERAGE   -0.457 0.004 -2.390 0.000 -0.779 0.000 -0.198 0.009 
RETE   0.023 0.244 0.178 0.005 0.014 0.397 0.020 0.146 
EARNINGS   1.025 0.002 4.294 0.000 -0.285 0.391 1.271 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.005 0.097 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.077 0.002 0.007 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.011 0.044 0.045 0.039 0.016 0.052 0.061 0.013 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.236 0.028 -0.106 0.055 -0.109 0.021 -0.075 0.010 
SALESGROWTH   -0.313 0.060 -0.210 0.039 -0.106 0.061 -0.059 0.052 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   -0.028 0.191 0.690 0.000 0.038 0.353 -0.023 0.021 
INCOMERISK   -0.099 0.772 0.002 0.999 0.834 0.591 0.825 0.011 
CATERING   0.051 0.060 -0.029 0.685 -0.030 0.406 0.021 0.134 
GDPGROWTH   0.090 0.890 4.130 0.007 -0.867 0.171 0.912 0.035 
YEAR   0.003 0.047 0.021 0.015 0.006 0.034 0.001 0.069 
Constant 0.155 0.498 -0.070 0.791 -4.043 0.000 0.364 0.675 -0.037 0.778 
Observation 2119   2119   2120   1824   2120   
Firms 191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. overall 0.222  0.288  0.693  0.111  0.431  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Table 8: Relation between firm age and dividend taxation and privatized firms’ dividends  
This Table reports regression models that test whether firm age and dividend taxation are related to privatized firms’ dividends. Due to data constraints, the sample of privatized firms here is 
reduced to 181. In Panel A, we include firm’s age, and in Panel B, we include the country-specific annual dividend tax penalty (TAXPENALTY) proposed by Poterba and Summers (1984). We 
primarily test for these variables by adding them to Model 2 of Tables 6 and 7. Below we report the results for REVENUE_NEW and key governance, political orientation, national deficit 
variables, interaction and additional control variables. For brevity, we do not report the firm-specific determinants. DIV/SALES is the dependent variable in all models. We control for the firm-
level industry fixed effects and year fixed effects across all the models and country fixed effects in Models 2, 4, 5 and 6. Values under Coeff correspond to the regression coefficients and P-Val 
corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated using robust standard errors at the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables.  
 
Panel A: Additional Control (AGE) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
             
REVENUE_NEW 0.578 0.032 0.194 0.000 0.407 0.006 0.152 0.015 0.252 0.048 0.340 0.019 
COMMONLAW -0.189 0.264           
REVENUE_NEW * COMMONLAW -0.503 0.066           
RULELAW   0.088 0.470         
REVENUE_NEW * RULELAW   -0.111 0.003         
SHAREHOLDERRIGHT     0.080 0.022       
REVENUE_NEW * SHAREHOLDERRIGHT     -0.184 0.000       
LEFTWING       -0.069 0.100   -0.202 0.089 
REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING       0.023 0.733   0.198 0.240 
NATIONALDEFICIT         0.256 0.152 0.074 0.684 
REVENUE_NEW * NATIONALDEFICIT         -0.156 0.319 -0.128 0.398 
LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT           0.184 0.172 
REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT           -0.073 0.714 
Ln (AGE) -0.111 0.003 -0.092 0.010 0.017 0.642 -0.094 0.009 -0.094 0.009 -0.048 0.182 
Constant 0.324 0.272 0.110 0.719 -0.071 0.790 0.107 0.738 -0.073 0.830 0.011 0.974 
Firm-Level Controls Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observation 1948  1948  1948  1948  1948  1948  
Firms 181  181  181  181  181  181  
Rsq. overall 0.224  0.291  0.213  0.277  0.282  0.282  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects No   Yes   No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Panel B: Additional Control (TAXPENALTY) 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
             
REVENUE_NEW 0.809 0.012 0.306 0.000 0.706 0.000 0.226 0.001 0.416 0.009 0.435 0.021 
COMMONLAW -0.306 0.082           
REVENUE_NEW * COMMONLAW -0.655 0.043           
RULELAW   0.022 0.829         
REVENUE_NEW * RULELAW   -0.183 0.000         
SHAREHOLDERRIGHT     0.103 0.026       
REVENUE_NEW * SHAREHOLDERRIGHT     -0.381 0.000       
LEFTWING       -0.029 0.451   -0.096 0.441 
REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING       -0.015 0.789   0.171 0.473 
NATIONALDEFICIT         0.156 0.525 -0.036 0.829 
REVENUE_NEW * NATIONALDEFICIT         -0.270 0.119 -0.288 0.133 
LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT           0.091 0.520 
REVENUE_NEW * LEFTWING * NATIONALDEFICIT           0.022 0.899 
TAXPENALTY 0.078 0.371 0.004 0.968 -0.034 0.646 -0.032 0.724 -0.070 0.470 -0.059 0.521 
Constant 0.376 0.126 0.764 0.017 -0.017 0.926 0.781 0.003 0.703 0.002 0.723 0.002 
Firm-Level Controls Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observation 1446  1446  1446  1446  1446  1446  
Firms 116  116  116  116  116  116  
Rsq. Overall 0.225  0.307  0.191  0.260  0.269  0.269  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects No   Yes   No   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Appendix A: Detailed description of variables used in the analysis 
 
This Table presents a description of the firm characteristics and all proxy variables used in the analysis. 
Variables 
 
Definition 
 
Panel A: Privatization and payout variables 
PVT A dummy variable, which indicates whether a company is privatized; PVT=1 if it is privatized 
firms and zero otherwise. Privatization is defined as a government or government controlled 
entity which sells shares or assets to a non-government entity (Worldscope). Privatization 
includes both indirect and direct sales of up to a 100% stake to an identifiable buyer and 
floatation of stock on a stock exchange. 
DIV 
 
 
Ln (1+DIV) 
 
 
DIV/SALES 
The total real (1990 prices) amount of common cash dividend distributed by the firm, in 
millions of US$. We drop firm-years with a negative dividend payout which is rare, but present 
in few cases. 
DIV is as defined above. The natural logarithm of the (1 + DIV) is used as one of the measures 
of dividends. 
DIV is as defined above. SALES is the total sales by the firm in the same fiscal year. We drop 
firm-years with zero or negative sales. The effective dependent variable is the ratio of the 
dividends divided by the sales. 
DIV/EBIT 
 
 
 
 
 
DIV/TOTALASSETS 
 
DIV is as defined above. EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes by the firm in the same 
fiscal year. We drop firm-years with zero or negative EBIT. The effective dependent variable 
is the ratio of the dividends divided by the earnings before interest and taxes. 
DIV is as defined above. Exact definition for TOTALASSETS is provided in Panel B below. 
We drop firm-years with zero or (in very rare case) negative total assets. The effective 
dependent variable is the ratio of the dividends divided by the total assets. 
 
Since the lower bound of all the dividend ratios is zero, we winsorize these variables at an 
upper 1% level to account for the outliers. 
 
Panel B: Firm-specific variables 
Size 
 
TOTALASSETS 
TOTALASSETS if the total real (1990 prices) amount of total assets of the firm, in millions of 
US$.  
In our regression models, we use Ln(TOTALASSETS), which is natural logarithm of 
TOTALASSETS. 
Profitability 
 
EARNINGS The firm earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) as a ratio of total assets. 
ABNORMALEARNING 
Change in annual net income over two consecutive financial years, as a ratio of year-end market 
capitalization. 
Liquidity 
 
RETE The retained earnings as a ratio of the market value of firm equity. 
CASH The sum of cash and short term investments as a ratio of total assets of the firm. 
 
Ownership 
 
CLOSE 
Number of shares held by insiders as a percentage of the total number of outstanding shares. 
Insiders include officers, directors, or their immediate families, or anyone that holds more than 
5% of the shares.  
FOREIGN 
A dummy variable, which indicates whether the primary investor in a newly privatized firm is 
a foreign / overseas firm, FOREIGN = 1; otherwise zero. 
INSTITUTIONAL 
A dummy variable, which indicates whether the primary investor in a newly privatized firm is 
an institutional investor firm, INSTITUTIONAL = 1; otherwise zero. 
TOTALGOVHOLDING 
A proportion which indicates the extent of a firm's stock owned by the state year-by-year during 
the post privatization period. These data are sourced at the KPMG Privatization Barometer. 
They are available for European privatizations only. 
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REVENUE_NEW 
A dummy variable, which indicates whether the government has a majority holding (>50%) in 
the firm at the end of each fiscal year, REVENUE_ NEW = 1; otherwise zero. 
 
PARTIAL_PVT 
 
Risk 
A dummy variable, which indicates whether the government has a holding (>0%) in the firm 
at the end of the fiscal year, PARTIAL_ PVT = 1; otherwise zero. 
 
INCOMERISK 
The standard deviation of net income as a fraction of total assets over the most recent three 
years including the current fiscal year. 
Growth 
 
ASSETGROWTH 
The relative change of the total assets in real (1990 prices) millions of US$.  
ASSETGROWTHt = ln(TOTALASSETSt / TOTALASSETSt-1), where ln is natural logarithm. 
SALESGROWTH 
The relative change of the total sales in real (1990 prices) millions of US$. 
 SALESGROWTHt = ln(SALESt / SALESt-1), where ln is natural logarithm. 
Leverage 
 
LEVERAGE The sum of short-term and long-term debt as a ratio of the total assets of the firm. 
Efficiency 
 
SALES/EMPLOYEES 
The total real (1990 prices) sales of the firm in millions of US$ as a fraction of the total number 
of employees working in a firm. 
EMPLOYEES 
The total number of both full-time and part-time employees working in a firm. In our regression 
analysis, we use the natural logarithm of EMPLOYEES. 
Age  
AGE 
Difference between the year of observation and the year of incorporation of the firm. In our 
regression analysis, we use the natural logarithm of AGE. 
Panel C: Country and year-specific variables 
COMMONLAW 
A dummy variable, which indicates whether a company originates from a common law 
country; COMMONLAW = 1, otherwise zero. 
RULELAW 
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
the society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, and the courts 
(LaPorta et al., 1998; Kaufmann et al., 2016). 
SHAREHOLDERRIGHT 
Country-specific Anti-Director Rights Index based on Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann 
(2010). 
GDPGROWTH Country-specific annual GDP per capita growth. 
LEFTWING 
Country-specific annual dummy variable, which indicates whether the main governing party 
in the Central Government is left-wing oriented; LEFTWING = 1, otherwise zero. 
NATIONALDEFICIT Country-specific total annual outstanding government debt divided by the GDP. 
CATERING 
Country-specific annual dividend-catering measure in line with Baker and Wurgler (2004). A 
country catering dummy variable takes the value of one if the log of the median market-to-
book value of a minimum of five payers in each country is larger than the log of the median 
market-to-book value of a minimum of five nonpayers in the same country, and zero otherwise. 
TAXPENALTY 
Dividend tax penalty is attributable to Poterba and Summers (1984) and defined as 𝛿 . =
.  
 
 
 
 , where 𝜏 . Is the dividend tax rate, 𝜏  is the capital gains tax rate and α is the 
imputation rate (α varies from 0% to 33%). TAXPENALTY is calculated in all countries except 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia, Peru, Russia and Turkey due to data 
availability limitations. 
YEAR 
Year of observation of the firm-level characteristics in the regression analysis, from 1990 to 
2013. 
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Appendix B: Sample description by country, level of development, industry competitiveness, legal system, 
type of privatization, and industry sector 
This Table presents a description of the sample of privatized firms, their average cash dividend payments (in 
millions of 1990 real US$) and dividend scaled by sales, from 1990 to 2013. The column Firms refers to the 
number of privatized firms. Dividend refers to the average value of DIV. All the DIV observations have been 
converted from local currency to US$ by using the year-end conversion rate. DIV/SALES refers to average 
value of annual common cash dividend scaled by the year-end sales. Panel 1 reports the number of firms 
and dividends by country. Panel 2 divides the sample by legal system: common versus civil law countries. Panel 
3 reports dividends based on control style versus revenue style privatizations. Panel 4 reports the number of firms 
and dividends by industry sector. 
 
Countries Firms Dividend DIV/SALES   Categories Firms Dividend DIV/SALES 
         
Panel 1: Observations by country      
         
Argentina 5 217.79 0.2855      
Australia 4 659.99 0.3055  Panel 2: By legal system 
Austria 6 128.29 0.2555      
Brazil 23 304.62 0.3713      
Canada 5 103.71 0.2541  Common law 26 198.85 0.1433 
Chile 2 112.74 0.5100  Civil law 165 324.49 0.3037 
China 9 993.27 0.2373      
Finland 5 66.05 0.2408      
France 16 403.91 0.2639  Panel 3: By type of privatization 
Germany 13 375.36 0.2344      
Greece 6 134.31 0.3259      
India 2 85.14 0.1521  Control 59 88.48 0.1727 
Italy 12 712.16 0.2279  Revenue 132 396.06 0.3278 
Malaysia 3 109.56 0.3608      
Mexico 1 596.92 0.4244      
Netherlands 2 218.68 0.1531  Panel 4: By industry sector 
New Zealand 3 40.85 0.3537      
Norway 2 242.90 0.3600      
Peru 6 77.21 0.4276  Agri. + Mine + Const. 18 584.48 0.2732 
Poland 15 67.81 0.1836  Manufacturing 65 307.86 0.2281 
Portugal 4 381.72 0.3970  Transportation 21 94.06 0.2200 
Russia 17 242.10 0.1578  Telecommunication 21 639.77 0.3366 
Spain 6 766.80 0.3238  Utilities 43 236.73 0.3725 
Sweden 7 35.14 0.2815  Wholesale / Retail 6 108.07 0.1684 
Turkey 8 60.80 0.1875  Financials 3 14.03 0.3100 
UK 9 113.12 0.2897  Others 14 70.02 0.2577 
         
Total 191 306.83 0.2763           
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Appendix C: Change in firm characteristics around privatization: Univariate analysis 
This Table reports univariate analysis for various firm characteristics 3 years before and 3 years after privatization. 
N refers to the number of firms observed for the specific variable. We require firms to have at least 2 years of data 
both before and after privatization. Consequently, the firms included for this analysis are privatized between 1992 
and 2011. Expected Change refers to the anticipated change in the firm-level financial and accounting parameters 
after privatization. Sign refers to the expected sign of the difference in mean and median proxy variable values 
from before to after privatization. Proportion refers to the percentage of firms whose proxy values change as 
expected, as well as a test of significance of this change (Z-statistics). Before and After refer to the mean and 
median values of the proxy variables for the 3-year periods before and after privatization. Difference refers to the 
difference in mean and median values for 3 years after privatization minus mean and median values for 3 years 
before privatization. We use the two-sample mean-comparison test (T-statistics) and the Wilcoxon signed rank 
test (Z-statistics) to test the significance of differences in mean and median values, respectively. We use the 
country-specific consumer price index to deflate the nominal firm specific accounting and financial data into real 
1990 prices. The proxy variables have been converted from local currencies to US$ by using the year-end 
conversion rates. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables. 
 
    Expected Change Mean Median 
  N Sign Proportion Before After Difference Before After Difference 
Ownership          
CLOSE 119 (-) 1.000 a 1.000 0.542 -0.458 a 1.000 0.574 -0.426 a 
Liquidity                   
CASH 120 (+)     0.483  0.272 0.277     0.005 0.244 0.329     0.085  
RETE 113 (+) 0.664 a 0.183 0.111 -0.073 c 0.135 0.185 0.050 a 
Leverage          
LEVERAGE 120 (-) 0.648 c 0.260 0.224 -0.036 c 0.220 0.160 -0.060 c 
Profitability                   
EARNINGS 119 (+) 0.588 c 0.087 0.098 0.011 b 0.074 0.081 0.007 c 
ABNORMALEARNING 95 (+) 0.654 a -0.456 0.434 0.890 c 0.385 0.428 0.043 c 
Efficiency          
SALES/EMPLOYEES 113 (+) 0.796 a 0.364 0.520 0.156 a 0.170 0.202 0.032 a 
Growth                   
ASSETGROWTH 103 (+) 0.660 b 0.065 0.086 0.021 b 0.063 0.073 0.010 c 
SALESGROWTH 102 (+) 0.706 b 0.086 0.118 0.032 b 0.064 0.075 0.012 b 
Size          
TOTALASSETS 120 (+) 0.717 a 9179.95 11286.39 2106.44 b 2006.67 2921.57 914.89 a 
Risk                   
INCOMERISK 102 (-) 0.647 a 0.406 0.328 -0.077 a 0.263 0.204 -0.059 a 
 
a, b, and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix D: Firm characteristics for privatized vs. non-privatized firms: Univariate analysis 
This Table reports summary statistics for firm characteristics of privatized and non-privatized firms in our sample 
from 1990 through 2013. N refers to the number of firm-year observations available for the respective variable in 
each category. Mean and Median are the arithmetic average and median value for each proxy variable. We use 
the country-specific consumer price indices to deflate the nominal firm specific accounting and financial data into 
real 1990 prices. All the proxy variables have been converted from local currencies to US$ by using the year-end 
conversion rates. We use the two-sample mean-comparison test (T-statistics) and the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
(Z-statistics) to test the significance of differences in mean and median values, respectively. Please refer to 
Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables. 
 
  Privatized Firms Non-Privatized Firms Difference  
  N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median 
Ownership         
CLOSE 2784 0.533 0.548 66586 0.453 0.473 0.080 a 0.075 a 
Liquidity                 
CASH 3339 0.286 0.238 78411 0.286 0.207       0.001 0.031 a 
RETE 3162 0.231 0.228 76028 -0.034 0.209 0.265 a 0.018 a 
Leverage         
LEVERAGE 3359 0.241 0.229 79397 0.215 0.190 0.026 a 0.039 a 
Profitability                 
EARNINGS 3314 0.092 0.082 78420 0.043 0.067 0.049 c 0.015 a 
ABNORMALEARNING 3057 -0.240 0.570 73622 1.640 0.520      -1.879  0.050 a 
Efficiency         
SALES/EMPLOYEES 3028 0.497 0.230 70794 0.417 0.170 0.080 a 0.060 a 
Growth                 
ASSETGROWTH 3228 0.072 0.060 75836 0.101 0.066 -0.029 a -0.006 a 
SALESGROWTH 3226 0.081 0.078 74166 0.094 0.080 -0.013 b    -0.002  
Size         
TOTALASSETS 3359 14538.13 2940.40 79431 2160.84 189.71 12377.29 a 2750.69 a 
Risk                 
INCOMERISK 3345 0.039 0.024 79804 0.304 0.034 -0.266 a -0.010 a 
 
a, b, and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix E Privatization on dividends: Multivariate analysis with propensity score matched sample 
This Table reports results for panel regressions for 191 privatized and matching non-privatized firms during 1990 
to 2013. Each privatized firms is matched with a non-privatized firm using the propensity score matching (PSM) 
technique. The matching is performed using the same year of listing, country of origin, firm’s total assets, cash 
holdings, and growth in total assets. In Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is DIV/SALES. We test the 
robustness of the findings, in Models 3-5, using different dependent variables to capture dividends. To reduce the 
endogeneity problem the independent variables, except PVT and YEAR, are lagged by one year.  We control for 
the firm-level industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Values under Coeff correspond 
to the regression coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated using 
robust standard errors at the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables. 
 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
           
PVT 0.178 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.603 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.139 0.000 
CLOSE   0.024 0.080 0.567 0.001 0.054 0.008 0.027 0.020 
CASH   0.019 0.253 0.041 0.841 -0.016 0.522 -0.003 0.842 
LEVERAGE   -0.113 0.000 -1.601 0.000 -0.181 0.000 -0.117 0.000 
RETE   0.010 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.010 0.000 
EARNINGS   0.035 0.045 0.405 0.066 -0.043 0.538 0.056 0.011 
ABNORMALEARNING   0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES   0.015 0.071 0.053 0.653 0.020 0.158 0.007 0.040 
ASSETGROWTH   -0.010 0.090 -0.389 0.000 -0.023 0.081 -0.027 0.000 
SALESGROWTH   -0.013 0.024 -0.061 0.228 -0.008 0.630 -0.002 0.512 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)   0.011 0.000 0.865 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.005 0.047 
INCOMERISK   -0.002 0.894 0.478 0.027 -0.108 0.184 0.002 0.865 
CATERING   0.002 0.729 -0.021 0.739 -0.003 0.707 -0.002 0.681 
GDPGROWTH   0.181 0.099 3.462 0.011 0.027 0.881 0.264 0.009 
YEAR   0.020 0.073 0.007 0.033 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.080 
Constant 0.061 0.270 0.041 0.437 -3.280 0.000 0.135 0.026 0.055 0.220 
Observation 4125   4125   4132   3555   4132   
Firms 382  382  382  376  382  
Rsq. overall 0.502  0.543  0.718  0.444  0.503  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Appendix F: Dividends for partially versus fully privatized firms  
This Table reports results for panel regressions for 191 privatized firms in our sample during 1990 to 2013. Key variable of interest is PARTIAL_PVT, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the State has holding in the privatized firm, and 0 if the State has sold 100% holding in the firm. For each sample firm, we searched news articles etc. to determine if and when the state fully 
privatized the firm. The dependent variable in Model 1 through Model 4 is DIV/SALES. In Models 5, 6, and 7, we re-test impact of determinants included in Model 4 by using Ln (1+DIV), 
DIV/EBIT, and DIV/TOTALASSETS as the dependent variables, respectively. To reduce the endogeneity problem the independent variables, except for the time invariant dummies (FOREIGN 
and INSTITUTIONAL) and YEAR, are lagged by one year.  We control for the firm-level industry fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Values under Coeff correspond to 
the regression coefficients and P-Val corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated using robust standard errors at the firm-level. Please refer to Appendix A for detailed 
definitions of all variables. 
 
Dependent Variable → DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES DIV/SALES Ln (1+DIV) DIV/EBIT DIV/TOTALASSETS 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
               
PARTIAL_PVT 0.139 0.009 0.129 0.017 0.126 0.020 0.146 0.005 0.218 0.088 0.140 0.079 0.076 0.071 
FOREIGN   0.134 0.067 0.132 0.071 0.156 0.035 0.870 0.000 -1.769 0.323 0.092 0.011 
INSTITUTIONAL   0.030 0.684 0.035 0.635 0.064 0.434 0.610 0.000 1.379 0.300 0.086 0.001 
CLOSE     0.074 0.488 0.064 0.518 0.438 0.039 -0.125 0.263 0.014 0.697 
CASH       0.455 0.019 0.388 0.116 0.170 0.186 0.183 0.004 
LEVERAGE       -0.433 0.007 -2.317 0.000 -0.750 0.000 -0.190 0.010 
RETE       0.023 0.056 0.180 0.003 0.015 0.184 0.020 0.067 
EARNINGS       1.032 0.002 4.305 0.000 -0.244 0.470 1.256 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING       0.001 0.935 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.815 0.002 0.006 
SALES/EMPLOYEES       0.009 0.046 0.037 0.044 0.014 0.057 0.060 0.014 
ASSETGROWTH       -0.232 0.073 -0.095 0.073 -0.108 0.107 -0.073 0.027 
SALESGROWTH       -0.303 0.078 -0.197 0.056 -0.094 0.089 -0.059 0.066 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)       0.026 0.253 0.700 0.000 0.044 0.269 0.022 0.031 
INCOMERISK       -0.072 0.818 0.100 0.953 0.832 0.597 0.810 0.011 
CATERING       0.057 0.028 -0.015 0.837 -0.028 0.413 0.021 0.125 
GDPGROWTH       -0.263 0.678 3.067 0.058 -0.889 0.123 0.823 0.069 
YEAR       0.003 0.048 0.025 0.007 0.004 0.049 0.001 0.074 
Constant 0.183 0.363 0.143 0.430 0.088 0.667 -0.069 0.780 -3.957 0.000 0.339 0.699 -0.038 0.734 
Observation 2119   2119   2119   2119   2120   1824   2120   
Firms 191  191  191  191  191  188  191  
Rsq. Overall 0.216  0.219  0.219  0.284  0.691  0.111  0.423  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Appendix G: Likelihood of dividends by privatized firms 
This Table reports results for Probit regressions for the 191 privatized firms in our sample during 1990 to 2013. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends, and 0 otherwise. To reduce the 
endogeneity problem the independent variables, except for the time invariant dummies (FOREIGN and 
INSTITUTIONAL) and YEAR, are lagged by one year.  We control for the firm-level industry fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and country fixed effects. Values under Coeff correspond to the regression coefficients and P-Val 
corresponds to the level of significance of the Z-value calculated using robust standard errors at the firm-level. 
Please refer to Appendix A for detailed definitions of all variables.  
 
Independent Variables ↓ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val Coeff P-Val 
         
REVENUE_NEW 0.196 0.035 0.246 0.021 0.170 0.036 0.186 0.039 
FOREIGN   0.950 0.000 0.929 0.000 0.526 0.062 
INSTITUTIONAL   1.287 0.000 1.221 0.000 0.835 0.001 
CLOSE     0.766 0.012 0.624 0.040 
CASH       0.995 0.014 
LEVERAGE       -2.350 0.002 
RETE       0.209 0.055 
EARNINGS       4.684 0.000 
ABNORMALEARNING       0.001 0.000 
SALES/EMPLOYEES       0.009 0.094 
ASSETGROWTH       -0.003 0.099 
SALESGROWTH       -0.289 0.081 
Ln (TOTALASSETS)       0.325 0.001 
INCOMERISK       -3.760 0.219 
CATERING       -0.015 0.903 
GDPGROWTH       1.233 0.413 
YEAR       0.024 0.096 
Constant 1.598 0.000 0.516 0.004 0.945 0.000 -0.824 0.253 
Observation 2119   2119   2119   2119   
Firms 191  191  191  191  
Wald Chi Sq 8.60  53.94  65.71  136.49  
Prob. 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Ind. fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
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